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PRESIDENTIAL WAR-MAKING: CONSTITUTIONAL 
PREROGATIVE OR USURPATION? 
W. Taylor Reveley Ill* 
AMONG the principal rites of an unpopular war is the inquisition: the investigation of those men and institutions responsible for the 
decision to fight. Often the inquisition seeks only scapegoats.1 But 
occasionally it is less concerned with fixing blame than with avoiding 
future evil. Much of the current inquiry into the scope of the Presi-
dent's constitutional authority to commit American troops to foreign 
conflict partakes more of the redemptive than the punitive.2 Reasoned 
consideration of the question, however, is difficult for at least three 
reasons. The problem is many-faceted; the relevant context, in both 
its precedential and policy elements, unusually rich; and passions on 
the matter notably high. Thus, there is danger of a simplistic analysis 
based upon only a few of the pertinent factors, supported by selected 
bits of precedent and policy, and given direction by a visceral reaction 
to Vietnam. Karl Llewellyn's injunction that the reader should till an 
author "for his wheat, sorting out his chaff" 3 is singularly appropriate 
regarding treatments of this aspect of presidential power. What fol-
lows is an attempt to delineate the bounds of the problem-an attempt 
undertaken with an awareness of the inherent opportunities for error. 
• A.B., 1965, Princeton University; LL.B., 1968, University of Virginia. 
1 Some of the present assaults on the military seem to be in this vein. See, e.g., 
Finney, Questions over Military: Bombardment on What It Is Doing and Why, N.Y. 
Times, May 25, 1969, § 4, at 1, cols. 2-6; The Military-Industrial Complex, NEWSWEEK, 
June 9, 1969, at 74-87. See generally Military: Servant or Master of Policy, TIME, 
Aprilll, 1969, at 20-26. 
2 Among the better treatments of the question are F. WQRMUTH, THE VIETNAM 
\VAR: THE PRESIDENT VEasus TilE CoNSTITUTION (April 1968) (Occasional Paper: 
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions) [hereinafter cited as WoRMUTH]; 
Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 DUKE L.J. 619; -Moore, The National 
Executive tmd the Use of the Armed Forces Abroad, 21 NAVAL WAR CoUEGE REv. 28 
(Jan. 1969); Schwartz & McCormack, The justiciability of Legal Objections to the 
American Military Effort in Vietnam, 46 TEXAs L. REv. 1033 (1968); Velvel, The War 
in Viet Nam: Unconstitutional, justiciable, and jurisdictionally Attackable, 16 KAN. -L. 
REv. 449 (1968); President's War Powers-! & n, C.Q. GUIDE TO CURRENT A:M. 
Gov'T 63, 67 (Spring 1968); Note, Congress, the President and the Power to Cummit 
Forces to Combat, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1771 (1968). 
s K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRA.MBLE BusH 10 (1960). 
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PoLITICAL oR jUDICIAL REsoLUTION oF THE IssuE? 
In theory, both the judicial and the political processes are available 
to set the limits on presidential use of force abroad. As a rule, the 
judicial and political processes differ notably in their mode of decision-
making. Courts generally reach the result dictated, or at least sug-
gested, by pre-existing law. Thus, judges emphasize precedent over 
policy and strive for an impartial decision, rather than for one that 
recognizes the relative power of the interests concerned. Political 
interaction, on the other hand, usually alters the legal status quo to 
meet the changing needs and demands of the community. Thus, policy 
is emphasized over precedent, and the decision is shaped by the relative 
power of the participants. 
These distinctions, however, lose much of their force in the context 
of constitutional limits on presidential power. Unlike cases involving 
statutory or even common law, constitutional questions leave courts 
far freer to make basic community decisions, not only because the 
judiciary is free of any actual or potential legislative ukase but also 
because it is interpreting an unusually ambiguous and evolutionary 
document.4 In the sensitive area of presidential power, the judiciary's 
instinct for self-preservation and its desire to hand down effective judg-
ments necessitate that some account be taken of the relative strength 
of the opposing interests. The contextual features which increase the 
judiciary's room for maneuver have the converse effect upon the polit-
ical decision-maker. His ability to alter the legal status quo is reduced 
when the norms in question are of constitutional stature. Thus, he 
must give far more attention to existing doctrine than usual, and he is 
pushed close to the role of the impartial applier of the law. 
Though it is important to recognize that the judicial and political 
processes would not be dissimilar in their approach to the limits on 
presidential use of force abroad, significant differences remain. A judi-
cial resolution would be more focused and clear-cut than a political one, 
but also more inflexible. It would be more concerned with the dictates 
of doctrine and less with the balance of power, and it would run a 
greater risk of being ignored or subverted than a political decision}' 
While judicial involvement in the question at hand has been vigorously 
urged, 6 the immediate prospect of such involvement is dim.7 Accord-
4 See text at notes 22-23 infra. 
15 See note 104 infra. 
6See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 2; Velvel, supra note 2, at 479-503(e). But see Moore, 
mpra note 2, at 35-36; Note, 81 HARv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1794. 
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ingly, to the extent that the issue is resolved, its resolution will come 
through the interaction of the President, Congress and the electorate-
a method often used to settle fundamental constitutional questions. 8 
THE IssUE MoRE FuLLY DEFINED 
The issue is best framed in terms of the constitutional limits on 
presidential power to pursue a foreign policy which may easily lead to 
armed conflict, rather than simply in terms of executive power to com-
mit troops to foreign combat.9 Resort to arms is rarely the first step in 
7 Though given ample oppommity to resolve the constitutionality of American 
participation in the Vietnam War, federal courts have consistently declined to consider 
the matter, primarily because they view it as a political question. See, e.g., Mora v. 
McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967); Luftig v. 
McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967); United States 
v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967); Velvel v. 
Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968); Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1051 n.61. 
8 See G. ScmmERT, JR., THE PRESIDENCY IN TilE CoURTS 347-48 (1957). 
9 It is well to note in passing the existence of a second level of legal restraints. Under 
international law, the United States, and possibly the President as an individual, are 
forbidden to use military force unilaterally except in self-defense, and are enjoined, 
whenever arms are employed, to follow the laws of war. The primary international 
stlicture against the use of force by states to resolve their disputes is U.N. CHARTER 
art. 2, para. 4: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Article 
2(4), however, is subject to the proviso stated in article 51: ''Nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." 
As there is no general consensus on the precise scope of the article 51 exception, the 
ban in article 2(4) on the use of force has proved less expansive than might have been 
expected. 
The laws of warfare have been codified in several multilateral treaties, especially 
the Hague Conventions of 1907, e.g., Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536; Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2396, T.S. No. 544; and 
the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, TJ.A.S. No. 
3364. 
The potential liability of the President, should he be guilty of waging an illegal war 
under international law, or of conducting in an illegal manner a struggle otherwise 
justified, sterns from the precedent set by the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes 
proceedings, in which individuals were held responsible for their participation in military 
operations deemed beyond the law. The tribunals' actions were affirmed unanimously 
by the United Nations General Assembly in its 1946 adoption of the principles of the 
Nuremberg Charter, G.A. Res. 95, UN. Doc. A /64/ Add. 1, at 188 (1946). Barring 
the conquest of the United States, the President runs no risk of actual trial for 
'fiolation of the Nuremberg principles, but they are h'kely to affect his conduct, Were 
he widely believed to be a war criminal, his political effectiveness would plummet, 
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the conduct of any American foreign policy. Armed force is generally 
used only in extremis to salvage a policy which more pacific modalities 
could not preserve and advance. Thus, the decision to use the military 
is usually taken under circumstances which make its dispatch hard to 
resist; pressures for commitment, both domestic and foreign, will exist 
which could have been avoided or mitigated had a different foreign 
policy been pursued.10 Though there is not a one-for-one correlation,. 
it is generally true that to limit presidential war-making, it is first nec-
essary to limit presidential policy-making.U 
both at home and abroad. And, perhaps more fundamentally, his own personal com-
mitment to the law usually dictates adherence to these principles, at least as he under-
stands them. See Falk, International Law and the United States Role m Viet Nam: 
A Response to Professor Moore, 76 YALE L.J. 1095, 1100-01 n.12 (1967); Schwartz, 
supra note 2, at 1033-35. 
Arguably these international provisions bear on domestic constitutional law. 
At one extreme, the possibility exists that presidential war-making in violation of 
international law is per se unconstitutional. See Falk, International Law and the 
United States Role in the Viet Nanz War, 75 YALE L.J. 1122, 1155 (1966). But see 
Falk, International Law and the United States Role m Viet Nam: A Response to 
Professor Moore, 76 YALE L.J. 1095, 1150-51 (1967). A middle reading of the relationship 
would place a breach of international law among the factors suggesting unconstitu-
tionality. At the other pole is an analysis which finds no necessary link between 
domestic and international law. The prevailing American authority supports the second 
extreme, holding that the constitutionality of presidential use of force abroad is stricdy 
a matter for domestic law. See Moore, International Law and the United States Role 
m Viet Nam: A Reply, 76 YALE L.J. 1051, 1092-93 (1967). Thus, a war illegal under 
-international doctrine may nonetheless be quite constitutional. 
10 To remain in power, a President and his congressional supporters can ill afford 
to admit that they have frnitlessly pursued a cosdy foreign policy. Thus, once objec-
tives are proclaimed and sought, their realization becomes important for the political 
survival of their proponents, irrespective of whether the goals in question have con-
tinuing merit. Similarly, to maintain the credibility of American commitments to 
contain communism, it has been felt essential to honor pledges to support other 
noncommunist governments, regardless of the inherent importance of the country 
being assisted. With reference to John F. Kennedy's decision to deepen American 
involvement in Vietnam, it has been authoritatively stated that 
he believed that a weakening in our basic resolve to help in Sontheast Asia 
would tend to encourage separate Soviet pressures in other areas. • • • 
[T]his concern specifically related to Khrushchev's aggressive designs on Berlin 
..•• President Kennedy clearly did believe that failure to keep the high degree of 
commitment we had in Viet-Nam . . . had a bearing on the validity of our 
commitments elsewhere. 
Bundy, The Path to Viet.:Nanz: A Lesson in Involvement, 57 DEP'T STATE BULL. 275, 280 
(1967). See note 20 infra. 
11 Recognition of the relationship between the President's control of foreign policy 
and his capacity to use the military abroad is not a recent phenomenon. It was clearly 
noted by Charles A. Beard, writing of times far more placid than the present: 
[The President] may do many things that vitally affect the foreign relations of 
the country. He may dismiss an ambassador or public minister of a foreign 
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Presidential war-making, as an actuality or feared potentiality, has 
been an issue throughout our history. The controversy has been fueled 
by the unpopularity of most of our wars, 12 by a deep-rooted fear with 
us since the framing of the Constitution that the President is grasping 
to himself all decision-making power/3 and by the nature of the 
Constitution itself. ·The document is notably vague concerning the al-
location of authority between the President and Congress over Ameri-
can foreign relations. Each is granted a line of powers which, in iso-
lation, could support a claim to final authority. Edward S. Corwin 
has spoken of these grants as "logical incompatibles" and indicated, in 
words now hallowed and hackneyed by frequent invocation, that "the 
power for political as well as personal reasons, and, if on the former ground, 
he might embroil the country in war. His power to receive any foreign repre-
sentative authorizes him to recognize the independence of a new state, perliaps 
in rebellion against its former legitimate sovereign, and thus he might incur 
the risk of war [for example, Mr. Roosevelt's recognition of the republic of 
Panama in revolt against Columbia]. He may order a fleet or ship to a foreign 
port under circumstances that may provoke serious difficulty; the ill-fated 
battleship Maine was sent to the harbor of Havana by President McKinley at 
a time when it was regarded by many Spaniards, though not officially, as an 
unfriendly act. •.. As commander-in-chief of the army he might move troops 
to such a position on the borders of a neighboring state as to bring about an 
armed conflict. A notable instance of such an action occurred in the case of 
the opening of the Mexican War, when President Polk ordered out troops into 
the disputed territory, and, on their being attacked by the Mexicans, declared 
that war existed by act of Mexico. Again, in his message to Congress the 
President may outline a foreign policy so hOstile to another nation as to precipi-
tate diplomatic difficulties, if not more serious results. This occurred in the case 
of the Venezuelan controversy, when President Cleveland recommended to 
Congress demands which Great Britain could hardly regard as anything but 
unfriendly. 
C. BEARD, AMERICAN GoVERNMENT AND PoLITics 196-97 (3d ed. 1920) (footnote 
omitted); accord, Morgenthau, The American Tradition in Foreign Policy, in FoREIGN 
PouCY IN ':VoRLD PoLmcs 246 (3d ed. 1967 R. Macridis). The Morgenthau theory 
is even more expansive than Beard's: "[The E.'i:ecutive] can narrow the freedom of 
choice which constitutionally lies with Congress to such an extent as to eliminate it for 
all practical purposes." I d. at 264. 
12 With the exception of the two World Wars, all substantial military efforts of the 
United States have been bitterly condemned by various elements of the population. 
See Fleming, Other Days-Other Vietmrms, Tms \VEEK, Dec. 31, 1967, at 4-7. 
13 Arthur Schlesinger has noted: 
There has been nothing more continuous throughout American history than 
commentary on the supposed tendency of the presidency to absorb all the 
powers of the American system. The theory • • • of the President as the great 
moloch generating its own divinity and about to swallow all power can be 
reproduced at every stage in our history, beginning with those who ••• com-
plained against the presidency of General Washington. 
A. Scm.EsmGER, ]R. & A. DE GRAZrA, CoNGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY: THEIR RoLE IN 
MoDERN TIMES 91 (1967); see M. CuNLIFFE & EDITORS oF AMERICAN HERITAGE, THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE HisrORY OF THE PRESIDENCY 170-83 (1968). 
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Constitution, considered only for its affirmative grants of powers 
capable of affecting the issue, is an invitation to struggle for the privi-
lege of directing American foreign policy." 14 Beyond its comple-
mentary grants of powers, the Constitution encourages confusion and 
struggle by the highly abstract terms in which it states many important 
powers. "The Congress shall have Power ..• [t]o declare War" 15 and 
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America," 16 for example, leave much to further definition. 
Finally, the document, partly because of its complementary and ab-
stract nature, frequently fails to indicate where the ultimate authority 
lies on many questions, such as the peacetime stationing of American 
troops abroad. 
Although the scope of presidential power to involve the country in 
war is not a new issue, it has become a matter of increasing importance 
since 1945. With the exception of two World Wars and the Cold War, 
armed force has generally played a very insignificant role in American 
diplomacy outside the Western Hemisphere. Even during the years 
immediately following Independence, when American security was be-
lieved to depend largely on the policies of European powers, no effort 
was made to influence those policies by the dispatch of United States 
forces to participate in European conflicts. Until the twentieth cen-
tury, three factors in particnlar-geography, the state of military tech-
nology and a viable European balance of power-enabled the United 
States to regard foreign relations very casually.U American security 
14 E. CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND PoWERS 1787-1957, at 171 (4th rev. ed. 1957). 
The fact that complementary powers were granted the President and Congress was not 
overlooked by the Framers. "Madison emphasized at some length in 1796 that 'if taken 
literally, and without limit' these passages from the Constitution 'must necessarily clash 
with each other,'" and that "there are no 'separate orbits' in which the various powers 
can move and no 'separate objects' on which they can operate without 'interfering 
with or touching each other.'" M. McDouGAL & AssoCIATES, STUDIES IN WoRID PuBuc 
ORDER 451, 453 (1960); see A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 1-5, 19-20. 
15 u.s. CoNST. art. I, § 8. 
16/d. art. II, § 1. 
17 Woodrow Wilson's full awakening, though it preceded that of most of his country-
men, took place only after he assumed the presidency. A passage from A. LINK, 
WILSoN nm DIPLOMATIST (1957), captures the lack of concern with foreign affairs 
typical of late nineteenth century America: 
In his first book, Ccmgressional GO'llemment, an inquiry into the practical 
functioning of the federal government published in 1885, Wilson made only a 
passing reference to foreign affairs, and that in connection with the Senate's 
treaty-making power. Four years later Wilson published The State, an excellent 
pioneer text in comparative government. Out of a total of more than one 
hundred pages devoted to the development of law and legal institutions, he gave 
a page and a half to international law. In his analysis of the administrative 
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was not deemed to depend upon that of distant states; there were no 
wide-ranging defense commitments. Moreover, even had a President 
desired to use armed force abroad on more than a piddling scale, he 
would have been pressed to muster sufficient troops. For much of their 
history, the Army and Navy could aptly be described as "tiny, obscure 
bodies," 18 with no draft laws in existence to swell their ranks and no 
federal income ta.~ available to fund a large military establishment. 
Under these circumstances, the armed efforts which were made 
tended to be modest in their use of men and resources; they were 
rarely directed against other established states; few were regarded as 
vital to our national defense; and thus most could have been easily aban-
doned or repudiated. Even if Presidents had believed that American 
interests required e:l\.-tensive use of force abroad, and had they pos-
sessed the capacity to act on their beliefs, the resulting danger would 
have had finite limits. Geography, military technology and the pre-
vailing balance of power would have kept the ensuing conflicts within 
survivable bounds. 
Conditions today, however, are radically different. The revolution 
in military technology has ended our geographic immunity, 19 leading, 
structures of modern governments, he described the machinery of the foreign 
relations of the British Empire in five words, but devoted twenty-sb: pages to 
local government in England; and he gave thirteen times as much space to the 
work of the Interior Department as to the Department of State in the American 
government. Finally, in his summary chapters on the functions and objects of 
government, he put foreign relations at the bottom of his list of what he called 
the "constituent functions" and then went on to elaborate the functions and 
objects of government without even mentioning the conduct of external affairs! 
I d. at 5-6 (foomotes omitted). 
\Vilson began to show more interest in foreign affairs during the 1890's and early 
1900's, concluding that the war with Spain had once again raised foreign questions to 
the fore in American politics, as well as greatly enhanced the power of the President. 
ld. at 6-9. Yet, ironically, he still failed to give serious attention to world developments 
prior to coming to the White House. Link concludes that ''Wilson did not concern 
himself seriously with affairs abroad during the period from 1901 to 1913 both because 
he was not interested and because he did not think that they were important enough 
to warrant any diversion from the mainstream of his thought." Id. at 11. 
18 Al\1ERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 13, at 190. In 1789 American armed forces on 
active duty totaled 718 men. By 1812 they had grown to over 12,000 but, with the 
exception of the Civil War years, never significantly exceeded 50,000 until their sudden 
increase to 200,000 during the Spanish-American War. After '\Vorld "\Var I, their 
number ranged between 250,000 and 300,000 for twenty years. Since 1950, however, 
there have been approximately 3,000,000 men under arms at all times. Note, 81 HARv. 
L. REv., supra note 2, at 1791 n.106. To conduct the Viemam War, the number has 
swelled to almost 3,500,000. BUREAu OF TIIE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T oF Col\1MERCE, STATISTI-
CAL A.llsmACT oF THE UNITED STATES 255 (90th ed. 1969). 
19 The interdependence of Americans with other peoples is not due merely to ad-
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first, to a belief that American security is intimately tied to that of 
many other countries and, second, to pledges that we will defend other 
nations.20 Evolution in the balance of world power has left the United 
States as one of the two great superstates in a bipolar system which ab-
hors the shift of territory from one bloc to another. And the revo-
lution in American military capacity has provided the President with a 
potent, flexible means of intervention abroad on a moment's notice-
a capacity which cold war Presidents have used freely in attempting 
to prevent a loss of territory to communism. Such initiation of force, 
even when clearly authorized by the Executive alone, was broadly 
supported until Vietnam, on the assumption that dissent might under-
mine American security.21 Furthermore, the existence of nuclear weap-
ons permits no assurance that all conflicts will remain within survivable 
limits. In sum, there has been reason for each cold war President to 
feel compelled to use force abroad, few restraints on his ability to 
act quickly and unilaterally, and strong popular feeling that his ac-
tions-whatever their nature-must be supported, although there has 
been little certainty about their ultimate consequences. Under these 
circumstances, the scope of presidential power to commit troops abroad 
becomes a matter of great import-far greater than ever before. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CoNSTITUTION TO THE IssUE 
What possible relevance can the Constitution, a product of the late 
vances in military technology and concern for our security. Revolutionary advances 
in the exchange of ideas, information, goods and services have left no realistic alterna-
tive to participation in global affairs. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories 
about International Law: Prologue to a CcmjifjUTative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 
188, 189-94 (1968). 
20 At present the United States has defense agreements with 48 foreign countries, and 
maintains approximately 400 major military installations abroad, stationing approximately 
900,000 troops in foreign fields, other than Viet Nam. TIME, April 11, 1969, at 26. 
To maintain the credibility of commitments to defend such vital areas as Western 
Europe, with nuclear weapons if necessary, Washington has often felt compelled to 
protect friendly regimes in nations of little intrinsic significance. Fear has also existed 
that the loss of one such state could easily lead to the general collapse of others 
similarly situated. See, e.g., Bundy, supra note 10, at 280-81. 
21 Once the President has committed troops to combat, he can generally rally support 
even from those opposed to his policies, by demanding that they back the boys in 
the field-or presumably face political oblivion. As President Johnson delicately sug-
gested in his message to Congress of May 4, 1965, requesting additional appropriations 
for Vietnam: ''To deny and to delay this means to deny and delay the fullest support 
of the American people and the American Congress to those brave men who are risking 
their lives for freedom in Vietnam." 111 CoNG. REc. 9284 (1965); see C. RossiTER, 
THE AMEru:CAN PRESIDENCY 51-52 (2d ed. 1960). 
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eighteenth century, have to an issue whose dimensions have changed 
radically even within the last twenty-five years? It seems that there 
are at least two major misapprehensions about the document. At one 
extreme is the assumption that it provides a wholly ascertainable, 
eternal set of dictates. Proponents of this position find much plain mean-
ing in the constitutional language and read any ambiguous or incom-
plete provisions in light of the intent of the Framers.22 To depart from 
this intent, formal amendment is deemed necessary. Adherents of strict 
construction also tend to assume that once the rules-that which is 
written in the document-are known, the whole of constitutional law 
has been grasped. 
At the other extreme is the assumption that the document is simply 
a hollow shell, given content by the practice of the moment. Pro-
ponents of this position find virtually no plain meaning in the relevant 
provisions, and, even when meaning appears, give it little or no weight 
if contemporary practice is contrary. The intent of the Framers fares 
no better. Thus~ the mere existence of current practice is proof of 
its constitutionality. Adherents of this view tend to assume that once 
the actual practice of the moment-the basic power machinations-are 
knmvn, the whole of constitutional law has been grasped. 
The problems with the position of the strict constructionists will 
be examined first. Plain meaning is an illusory goal in the interpretation 
of a document, such as the Constitution, which governs the continuing 
conduct of an immensely complex process in language notable for its 
abstraction, complementarity and frequent failure to speak to vital is-
sues. Such a document must receive much of its meaning from sources 
other than its wording. Moreover, since it was designed to remain per-
petually viable, the intent of the Framers, when available, binds subse-
quent interpreters far less than does the intent of the drafters of the 
typical contract or statutt-. 
In determining the meaning of any constitutional provision, the ulti-
mate criterion must be the long-term best interests of the country. If 
the Constitution is to remain functional, its interpretation has to move 
22 [TJhe mechanical, filiopietistic theory, purports to regard the words of the 
Constitution as timeless absolutes. The sole problem of an interpreter ••. is to 
find wha~ me~g the words had. ~ terms of the idiosyn~ratic purposes of the 
Framer~ m th: light of th: condltlons and events of their day. It is assumed 
that this mearung can be discovered and can and must be applied without loss 
or change, to the problems of the present day, by completely different people 
under completely different conditions. 
M. McDouGAL, supra note 14, at 444 (footnote omitted). 
1252 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 55:1243 
in pace with our changing needs and values.23 Encouraged by the Con-
stitution's linguistic .flexibility, and by the difficulty of its formal 
amendment process,24 alteration by usage has proved to be the principal 
means of modifying our fundamentallaw.25 The constitutional provi-
sions governing the conduct of foreign affairs have been duly affected 
by this evolutionary26 process. 
Strict constructionists thus fail to recognize the extent to which the 
document's language must be supplemented before it becomes mean-
ingful; they do not realize that the supplementation must ultimately 
23 [l]t is utterly fantastic to suppose that a document framed 150 years ago "to 
start a governmental experiment for an agricultural, sectional, seaboard folk of 
some three millions" could be interpreted today . . . in terms of the "true 
meaning" of its original Framers for the purpose of controlling the "government 
of a nation, a hundred and thirty millions strong, whose population and ad~ 
vanced industrial civilization have spread across a continent." Each generation 
of citizens must in a very real sense interpret the words of the Framers to 
create its own constitution. The more conscious the interpreters are that this 
is what they are doing the more likely it is that their interpretations will embody 
the best long-term interests of the nation. In truth, our very survival as a nation 
has been made possible only because the ultimate interpreters of the Constitu~ 
cion-presidents and congressional leaders, as well as judges-have repeatedly 
transcended the restrictive interpretations of their predecessors. 
ld. at 446-47 (footnotes omitted). 
24 McDougal suggests that the American people in their frequent alteration of the 
Constitution by informal adaptation 
have also been motivated by a wise realization of the inevitable transiency of 
political arrangements. The ultimate advantage of usage over formal te:\"tllal 
alteration as a method of constitutional change is that, while it preserves the 
formal symmetry of the document, it reduces the danger of freezing the struc~ 
tures of government within the mold dictated by the expediencies or political 
philosophy of any given era. A formal amendment may be outmoded shortly 
after it is adopted, but usage permits continual adjustment to the necessities of 
national existence. 
!d. at 545. 
In constitutions in which the language is more detailed and its formal amendment 
less difficult, change by usage is the exception. See Note, State Constitutional Change: 
The Constitutional Convention, 54 VA. L. REV. 995, 998-1000 (1968). 
25 In innumerable respects, the division of functions between the different 
branches of the government and the scope of federal authority, as clearly con~ 
templated by the Framers, have been altered by usage and prescription, without 
reson to formal textual amendment. "For every time that the Constitution has 
been amended," as Justice Byrnes has pointed our, "it has been changed ten 
times by custom or by jud1cial construction." This process of constitutional 
evolution has by no means been restricted to the numerous phases of government 
which the draftsmen deliberately left ambiguous or unsettled; in many instances 
the very words and phrases of the written Constitution have been given opera~ 
clonal meanings remote from the intentions of their original penmen. 
M. McDouGAL, supra note 14, at 542 (footnotes omitted). For numerous instances of 
alteration by usage, see id. at 442-75, 540-60. 
26 For a summary of some of the more important changes, such as the end of the 
Senate's role as a coordinate director of treaty negotiations and preemption by the 
President of the power of recognition, see id. at 557~0. 
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be in terms of the best interests of the country and not simply in the 
lock-step of the Framers' intent; and they will not accept that upon 
occasion even the clear intent of the Drafters must be abandoned with-
out the process of formal amendment, if the Constitution is to minister 
successfully to needs created by changing times. Their rigidity leads 
as well to one final misapprehension: that to know the rule is neces-
sarily to know the law. An understanding of what is written in the 
Constitution, even assuming a viable interpretation of the language, 
simply provides information regarding peoples' e:A'Pectations about the 
type of conduct that is constitutional. If acts forbidden by a reasonable 
reading of the rules continue to be performed, it is highly unrealistic 
to regard the rules as complete statements of the law. To constitute 
"the law" the course of conduct dictated by the rules must be the one 
followed in actual practice.27 
Strict constructionists are equalled in their error by those at the 
opposite pole who automatically bestow the mantle of constitutionality 
on whatever happens to be the practice of the moment. Although the 
document must receive much of its meaning from sources other than 
its language and its interpretation must evolve to meet the differing 
needs of differing times, it is not simply a hollow shell whose principles 
are ever in flux. The goal of constitutional interpretation, as indicated, 
should be a reading that serves the long-term best interests of the coun-
try. In realizing that goal, serious attention should be paid the intent 
of the Framers for at least two basic reasons. First, the Founding 
Fathers may have ordained a practice which still has validity. If their 
design is workable, it should be respected, particularly when the constitu-
27 In any particular community it is possible to observe among its constituent 
social processes a process of effective power, i.e., decisions of community-wide 
impact are in fact made and put into controlling effect. . . . [T]hese effective 
power decisions ... [are] of two different kinds. Some ... are taken from simple 
expediency, or sheer naked power, and enforced by severe deprivation or high 
indulgences, whether the community members like them or not. Other decisions, 
however, are taken in accordance with community ell."}lectations about how such 
decisions should be taken: they are taken by established decision-makers, in 
recognized structures of authority, related to community expectations of common 
interest, and supported by enough effective power to be put into effect in conse-
quential degree. 
It is these latter decisions, those taken in accordance with community expecta-
tions and enforced by organized community coercion, which are • . . most 
appropriately called ''law." In this conce:ption law is, thus, a process of decision 
in which authority and control are cOnJoined. 'Vithout authority, decision is 
but arbitrary coercion, naked power; without control, it is often illusion . 
.McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 1 GA. L. REv. I, 4 (1966); accord, .Moore, 
Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. 
L. REV. 662, 666 (196S). 
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tionallanguage, read in light of the intent of the Drafters, seems to be 
clear. A better way-of doing the job might be devised, but the design 
of the Framers should be honored lest its disregard undermine public 
confidence in the rule of law. The general public tends to take a 
strict view when confronted with clear language and intent,28 unless 
they feel that the applicable provision is blatantly detrimental to their 
interests. 
Accordingly, when conspicuous government officials disobey or ap-
pear to disobey the rules in their conduct of public affairs, the general 
public's respect for prevailing norms suifers.29 The government, one 
of whose major objectives must be the creation and maintenance of a 
rule of law, simply cannot ignore or seem to ignore the norms ap-
plicable to its proceedings without undermining the entire system. 
Thus, if it appears that the President is flouting the Constitution in 
his use of American troops abroad, an effect on lesser mortals will be 
unavoidable.30 If the document seems to be irrelevant to him, more 
28 Direct support for this proposition would be comforting, since it figures in this 
Article's subsequent analysis. Unfortunately, the only authority offered here is personal 
opinion. It seems that most people feel that the rule of law necessitates undeviating 
adherence to the intent of the law-giver, until the language in which he embodied his 
intent is physically changed in accordance with formal processes of revision. Nothing 
less will suffice to assure these people that our society is governed according to law, and 
not pursuant to the whim of public officials. Thus, pending formal amendment of the 
language of the Framers, most people believe that their intent ought to remain binding. 
Cf. P. MisHKIN & C. MoRRis, ON LAW IN CoURTs 78-81, 258-67 (1965) (the crisis of 
confidence engendered by judicial overruling of well-established doctrines). 
29 Since it would be virtually impossible to obtain the requisite level of obedience by 
coercion, the stability of our legal system depends largely upon voluntary obedience to 
the law. Thus, most people do not base their acceptance of laws primarily on fear 
that disobedience will result in apprehension and punishment. See H. HART, THE 
CoNCEPT OF LAw 79-88 (1961). On the contrary, public support for the legal system 
is motivated by a variety of other factors-habit, desire to conform, belief that a 
given law embodies a moral command or that it serves individual self-interest, aware-
ness that the legal system depends on acceptance of its norms, and assurance that other 
people and institutions are obeying the rules applicable to them. Should it appear that 
some elements of society disregard the law, then the willingness of their fellows to 
honor norms they find to be inconvenient or ill-advised will be notably lessened. 
30 Edward H. Levi recently noted: 
Our most pressing failure relates to our attitude toward the legal system. Civil 
disobedience and indifference to law have become sufficiently widespread to 
reflect and raise essentially naive questions as to the function of law in a 
modern socie~. It is paradoxical that the civil rights movement which in the 
almOst immediate past built upon law, and depended so much on the morality 
of acquiescence, should now, to some ell."tent, be the vehicle for the destruction 
of this acquiescence. The undeclared Viet Nam war has further emphasized the 
morality of illegal acts .•.. 
Levi, Unrest and the Universities, U. CHI. JVL'>.GAZINE, Jan./Feb. 1969, at 25 (emphasis 
added). 
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humble rules will be regarded with equal disdain by many of his fellow 
citizens. 31 
Thus, absent necessity to abandon old constitutional patterns, the 
contemporary interpreter would do better to follow them, reshaping 
and e::<..1:ending them to meet the needs of the times.32 Though the 
Framers may not have conceived of the conditions to which one of 
their provisions now applies, if its underlying principle remains tenable, 
the principle should be carefully and skillfully preserved. For example, 
if it seems clear that the Framers intended Congress to have a mean-
ingful voice in decisions regarding the use of American troops abroad, 
then every effort should be made to give life to that guiding principle, 
using procedures attuned to contemporary needs. 33 
Those who view the Constitution as a hollow shell, accordingly, 
overlook the framework which the document does frequently pro-
vide, and they fail to accord its language and the Framers' intent the 
weight they are due if the long-term best interests of the country are 
to be served. The Shellists' emphasis on the practice of the moment 
also leads them to a :final misapprehension: that to know what is actually 
done is necessarily to know the law. Practice, uuless it is in accord 
with the rules, is simply the exercise of naked power, not law. 
Americans have traditionally been concerned with constitutional 
rules. They want governmental power to be exercised in the pre-
scribed manner. Much of the controversy surrounding the Vietuam 
War concerns not simply the merits of the conflict but also the con-
stitutionality of the United States involvement. When practice is 
deemed to fall outside the rules, efforts will be made to bring it back 
within. Accordingly, immediate past precedent may or may not be 
upheld; its existence is not conclusive of its legality. 
In this regard, it is well to remember that most government officials-
including the President-voluntarily try to stay within the bounds of 
the constitutional provisions applicable to them.34 Peoples' expectations 
31 The President could, of course, argue that he is attempting to amend the Con-
stitution by usage, but the subtleties of such an argument would probably be lost on 
the general public. See note 28 supra. 
32 Moreover, adherance to established constitutional patterns may often increase the 
actor's political power and prestige. See note 180 infra. 
33 Cf. L. FULLER, THE MoRALITY oF LAw 84-85 (1964). 
34 See note 74 infra and accompanying text. A useful analogy can be drawn between 
presidential adherence to constitutional law in matters such as the use of force abroad 
and nations in their obedience to customary international law. As a rule, both appreciate 
the need to support the prevailing norms, and thus voluntarily accept them. Rarely 
would either, if accused of illegal activity, fail to deny the charge vociferously, 
adducing legal argument to justify the action. But since the precise demands of con-
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regarding the nature of the rules strongly influence the type of action 
actually taken, just as practice, in turn, shapes e:\.'Pectations. Constitu-
tional law, thus, is found where community understanding of the type 
of conduct required by the rules and what actually happens are largely 
synonymous.35 
One effective way to approach the constitutional question at hand is 
to study separately its practice and rule aspects, bringing them to-
gether after the features of each have been determined. Thus, an at-
tempt needs to be made to learn the extent to which the President 
has unilaterally decided to commit American troops to foreign combat, 
irrespective of rule-based e:\.'Pectations regarding the constitutionality 
of his action. Once aware of what has in fact been the practice, there 
must be an attempt to determine what type of presidential conduct 
people have believed to be constitutional. If practice is then found to 
diverge significantly from the rules, the two courses must be reconciled 
in terms of the best interests of the country. Should practice be long-
established and responsive to the needs of the times, the constitutional 
rules should evolve to meet it. Should practice, however, have need-
lessly and recently abandoned principles set out in the language of the 
document or evidenced by the Framers' intent, and embodied in con-
tinuing expectations, it should be altered to accord with the rules. A 
thorough examination of the nature just suggested would require sev-
eral volumes.36 For the purposes of this Article, it will suffice to trace 
stitutional and international rules are often vague, and since there is little chance of 
clarification by judicial or legislative action (formal amendment in the case of the 
Constitution), hoth the President and nations have latitude in interpreting the relevant 
provisions. Each tends to define, fill in and alter the legal contours by a process of 
claim and concession. If presidential assertions of authority are acknowledged and 
acquiesced in by Congress, the electorate, and, should they choose to comment, the 
courts, the Executive assumes the power as his constitutional due. Even presidential 
claims rejected by one or more of these groups remain as potential sources of law, 
especially if the President has given them more than verbal substance. Nations proceed 
by a similar process of claim and concession. Finally, both the President and states 
are likely to ignore well-established rules when confronted with crisis. See M. Kaplan 
& N. Katzenbach, Law in the International Community, in 2 THE STRATEGY oF WoRLD 
ORDER 34, 35-37 (R. Falk & S. Mendlovitz eds. 1966). 
35 See note 27 supra and accompanying text. 
36 All instances in which American troops were employed abroad would have to be 
examined to pinpoint the effective decision-makers. Expectations would have to be 
sought from a wide range of sources-''pre-1787 negotiations, subsequent practice by 
all branches of the government, statutory interpretations, judicial decisions and 
opinions, and the vast literature of expressions, formal and informal, about preferred 
public order." McDougal, supra note 27, at 18. And an intensive investigation would 
be required to identify the long-term best interests of the country and their policy 
implications. 
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briefly the allocation of power between the Executive and Congress 
since 1789, considering both the factors contributing to the present high 
state of presidential control and the existing restraints upon it. One 
constitutional rule, the congressional power to declare war, will be 
treated in detail, while other relevant provisions will receive more cur-
sory attention. Finally, an attempt will be made to view practice and 
rules together in light of the long-term best interests of the United 
States, outlining what seem to be the present constitutional limits upon 
the President. 
THE BALANCE BETWEEN PREsiDENT AND CoNGREss: PRACTICE 
Historical Background 
At the risk of gross o~er-simplification, three historical stages may be 
identified in the President's progress toward virtually complete con-
trol over the commitment of American troops abroad. The first ran 
from independence until the end of the nineteenth century and was a 
time of gennine collaboration between the President and Congress, and 
of executive deference to legislative will regarding the initiation of 
foreign conflicts. Numerous :figures are bruited about as representing 
the number of times during the course of American history that the 
President has unilaterally employed force abroad. One total frequently 
cited lists 125, the great bull{ occurring in the nineteenth century.37 
Their existence, it is often said, establishes that presidential war-making 
is no twentieth century parvenu.38 
37 SENATE Co.M.l\1. ON FoREIGN RELATioNs, 82d CoNG., 1ST SESs., PowERS oF THE PRESI-
DENT TO SEND ARMED FoRCES OursmE THE UNITED STATES (Comm. Print 1951). The 
report states in part: "Since the Constitution was adopted there have been at least 
125 incidents in which the President, without congressional authorization, ••• has 
ordered the Anned Forces to take action or maintain positions abroad." Id. at 2. 
For a similar finding, see J. RoGERS, WoRLD PoLICING AND THE CoNSTITUTION (1945), 
which describes 100 uses of American troops abroad between 1789 and 1945, and 
concludes that most of them were ordered unilaterally by the Executive. Since the 
publication of both these studies, there have been numerous additional instances of 
presidential use of force abroad, some of major impact. 
38 The State Department, in its defense of the Vietnam War, has stated: 
Since the Constitution was adopted there have been at least 125 instances in 
which the President has ordered the armed forces to take action or maintain 
positions abroad without obtaining prior congressional authorization, starting 
with the "undeclared war" with France (1798-1800). For example, President 
Truman ordered 250,000 troops to Korea during the Korean war of the early 
1950's. President Eisenhower dispatched 14,000 troops to Lebanon in 1958. 
The Constitution leaves to the President the judgment to determine whether 
the circumstances of a particular armed attack are so urgent and the potential 
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As precedent for Vietnam, however, the majority of the nineteenth 
century uses of force do not survive close scrutiny. Most were minor 
undertakings, designed to protect American citizens or property, or to 
revenge a slight to national honor, and most involved no combat, or 
even its likelihood, with the forces of another state.39 To use force 
abroad on a notable scale, the President of necessity would have had to 
request Congress to augment the standing Army and Navy.40 Executives 
of this era, in any event, were generally reluctant to undertake mili-
tary efforts abroad without congressional approval. Accordingly, there 
are instances during this period of presidential refusals to act because 
Congress had not been consulted or because it had withheld approval, 
and there are many occasions of executive action pursuant to meaning-
ful congressional authorization.41 
Some of the instances grouped within the 12 5 presidential uses of 
force are erroneously included, chiefly the Naval War with France 
of 1798-1800 and the Barbary Wars of 1801-05 and 1815, which were 
consequences so threatening to the security of the United States that he should 
act without formally consulting the Congress. 
Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam, 54 
DEP'T STATE BULL. 474,484-85 (1966). 
39 For a description of the instances involved, see J. RoGERs, supra note 37, at 53, 
56-67, 93-112; WoRMurn at 21-26. For a discussion of these events, see E. CoRWIN, 
ToTAL WAR AND nm CoNSTITUTION 144-50 (1947); R. LEoPoLD, THE GRowTH oF 
AMERICAN FoREIGN Poucv 96-98 (1962) [hereinafter cited as LEoPoLD); Note, 81 HARv. 
L. REv., supra note 2, at 1787-89. 
40 The E."l:ecutive's power to deploy American forces as their Commander-in-Chief 
posed few problerus. During virtually all of the 19th century the President 
moved military units at will and without protest; in so doing, he rarely exposed 
himself to the charge of provoking another nation to fire the first shot. Through 
his secretary of the navy he assigned permanent cruising squadrons to the 
Mediterranean in 1815, the Pacific in 1821, the Caribbean in 1822, the South 
Atlantic in 1826, the Far East in 1835, and the African coast in 1842. The purpose 
of these squadrons was to show the fiag, protect shipping, and encourage com-
merce. No contingents were regnlarly stationed on foreign soil, either to garrison 
an overseas base or to honor a diplomatic commitment. 
LEoPOLD at 99. Presidential deployment of armed forces did, however, impinge upon 
congressional power to declare war in Polk's dispatch of General Taylor into territory 
claimed by Mexico and in McKinley's dispatch of the Maine to Havana. Moreover, 
usurpation was threatened in Grant's abortive attempt to annex Santo Domingo and 
in Harrison's 1891 dispatch of a cruiser to seize Chilean ships that had violated 
American neutrality laws. See id. at 99-102, 117. 
41 See the instances cited in LEOPOLD at 97-98; WoRMUTH at 6-20. 
From 1836 to 1898, except for the administrations of Polk, Lincoln, and Cleve-
land, Capitol Hill tended to provide the initiative for the development of foreign 
policy. When, for example, the executive advocated expansionist policies-
Pierce in Cuba, Seward in Alaska, Grant in Santo Domingo-he instantly en-
countered violent congressional opposition. 
A. Scm.EsiNGER, supra note 13, at 24. 
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conducted with specific congressional approval.42 When presidential or-
ders to American naval commanders exceeded the congressional man-
date during the 1798-1800 hostilities~ the Supreme Court in Little v. 
Barreme43 ordered damages paid to the owner of a ship seized pursuant 
to executive instruction. It is unlikely, however, that President Adams 
was attempting by his conflicting orders to eA"Pand his war powers at 
the e}.."Pense of Congress, since he had previously divested himself of his 
role as Commander-in-Chief and, with Senate approval, conferred it 
upon George Washington. President Thomas Jefferson was almost as 
self-effacing; before receiving congressional approval of the First 
Barbary War, he refused to permit American naval commanders to do 
more than disarm and release enemy ships guilty of attacks on United 
States vessels. 
The era in question included three formally declared wars.44 The de-
cision to enter the vVar of 1812 was made by Congress after extended 
debate. Madison made no recommendation in favor of hostilities, though 
he did marshal a "telling case against England" in his message to Con-
gress of June 1, 1812. The primary impetus to battle, however, seems 
to have come from a group of "War Hawks" in the legislature.45 Sim-
ilarly, McKinley was pushed into war with Spain in 1898 by con-
42. With respect to the Naval War: "President Adams took absolutely no independent 
action. Congress passed a series of acts which amounted, so the Supreme Court said, 
to a declaration of imperfect war; and Adams complied with these statutes." WoRMUTH 
at 6; accord, LEOPOLD at 95. The acts were quite detailed regarding the nature of the 
hostilities authorized. See WoRMUTH at 6-9; LEOPOLD at 95. 
Though Jefferson unilaterally dispatched a naval squadron to the Mediterranean to 
protect American shipping from attack by Tripoli, he refused to permit offensive 
action until so authorized by Congress-much to Alexander Hamilton's outrage. See 
note 148 infra. Accordingly, an act was passed authorizing the President "fully to 
equip, officer, man and employ such of the armed vessels of the United States" as he 
found necessary to protect American commerce; to instruct the commanders of these 
ships to "subdue, seize, and make prize all vessels, goods, and effects, belonging to 
Bey of Tripoli, or to his subjects;" to commission privateers, and to take whatever 
"other acts of precaution or hostility as the state of war will justify." \VoRMUTII 
at 9-10; see LEoPoLD at 95-96. 
When Algiers in 1815 attacked American shipping, President Madison obtained 
authorization to use force similar to that given in 1802 against Tripoli. \VoRMUTH at 
10. Significantly, Congress refused the President's request for a formal declaration of 
war, granting him instead simply approval for limited hostilities. LEOPOLD at 96. 
436 U.S. (2 Cranch) 169 (1804). See the discussion of Little in WoRMUTH at 8-9. 
44 The greatest conflict of the period, the War Between the States, did not involve 
the use of force against foreign countries, though it gave rise to expectations about 
presidential power which have application in the foreign context. See notes 146, 158 
infra. 
45 See LEoPoLD at 62-64, 94; A. Scm.EsiNGER, supra note 13, at 23. 
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gressional and popular fervor, though he himself inadvertently stoked 
their passion by sending the Maine to Havana. Full congressional au-
thorization was given before the initiation of hostilities.46 Congress was, 
on the other hand, presented with a presidential fait accompli in 1846 .. 
Polk provoked the Mexicans into a conflict which the legislators felt 
compelled to approve, particularly in light of the colored version of the 
facts presented by the President.47 But within two years, the House of 
Representatives censured Polk for his part in the initiation of the con-
ill 48 ct. 
The second of the three stages mentioned previously began at the 
turn of the century and continued into World War II. Close col-
laboration between the Executive and Congress became the exception, 
as did presidential deference to congressional views on the use of 
force abroad. The legislators, nonetheless, remained a strong force in 
the shaping of foreign policies. Their influence, unfortunately, was 
often negative, obstructing the efforts of Presidents who saw a need 
to use American power to defend nascent security interests abroad. 
American military capacity had grown to the point, however, that the 
Executives had notable capacity for maneuver without prior congres-
sional action. 
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, Congress 
generally chose to watch quietly as the President unilaterally inter-
vened in the Western Hemisphere, presumably because majority senti-
ment favored militant American hegemony over this area.49 Presidents 
46 Congress first passed a joint resolution authorizing the President to use armed 
force if necessary to insure Cuban independence and Spanish withdrawal from the 
island and then followed with a formal declaration of war when Spain recalled its 
ambassador from Washington and showed no sign of leaving Cuba. See LEOPOLD at 
117, 169-79. 
47 Until the last decade of the 19th century "[o]nly in the case of Texas and the 
Mexican War did the executive encroach upon the legislature's constitutional preroga-
tive" by the manner in which he deployed American forces. LEOPOLD at 99. Leopold 
concludes that Polk "remains the sole president in history who, by needlessly deploying 
the armed forces, provoked an attack by a potential enemy." ld. at 101. But he also 
notes that virtually no protest was voiced in Congress during the first three months of 
General Taylor's advance into disputed territory and argues that "the silent ac-
quiescence by the legislature destroys some of the complaint that the e:'l:ecutive had 
usurped its war-making powers." !d. 
48 By an 85-81 vote the House ruled that the war had been "unnecessarily and un-
constitutionally begun by the President of the United States." CoNG. GLoBE, 30th Cong., 
1st Sess. 95 (1848). See WoRMUTH at 11. 
49 It was in November, 1903, in connection with the revolution in Panama, that a 
President of the United States first succeeded in exercising the war-making 
power without the consent of Congress. The purpose for which such power was 
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enjoyed similar freedom in the Far East50 although they exercised it 
less robustly. The first wholly unauthorized executive war-making, 
nonetheless, took place in China during the Boxer Rebellion at the 
turn of the century. 51 
During most of the 1920's and 1930's American force abroad was used 
sparingly, in part because of a more relaxed approach to the difficulties 
of the Latin states and in part as a result of a strong popular desire to 
exerted on this occasion was so popular a one that it was acquiesced in, with 
only slight objections, by both Congress and the public, and a most dangerous 
precedent for the future was thus created. 
Putney, Executive Assumption of the War Making Power, 7 NAT'L UNIV. L. REv. 1, 34 
(May 1927). 
Roosevelt, in fact, wonld have preferred congressional involvement in his disregard 
of Columbian sensibilities, but events overtook him. See LEOPOLD at 231. Though 
Putney seems inaccurate in stating that Roosevelt's activities in Panama marked the 
first instance of unauthorized presidential war-making, see note 51 infra and accom-
panying text, it did signal the beginning of significant military intervention in Latin 
states, generally pursuant to unilateral presidential command. See H. CLINE, THE 
UNITED STATES AND 1\<lExico 155-62, 174-83 (rev. ed. 1965); LEOPOLD at 251, 316-21; 
Putney, supra at 33-41; Note, 81 HARv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1789-90. 
w Before the Spanish-American War the expansionist spirit had been confined 
mainly to navalists and their intellectual camp-followers. The conquest of the 
Philippines, however, opened the eyes of the American business man in the Far 
Eastern markets. With the acquisition of the Philippines our line of defense 
was thrust into the viciuity of China and Japan. Does this seem a strange lunge 
for a republic which vaunted its isolationism? H so, it can be explained by 
saying that our isolationist barricade had only one wall. We shut only our 
eastern door, for Americans marched out of their house in other directions. 
United States history is replete with exploits, successful and abortive, against 
the territories of our southern, western and northern neighbors. Isolationism 
accelerated rather than inhibited continental expansiouism, for, in the beginning, 
we wanted to drive Europe out of North America. This impnlse created a 
restlessness that drove Americans westward to San Francisco and in due course 
beyond the Golden Gate to Honolulu and Manila. 
S. ADLER, THE IsoLATIONIST IMPULSE: ITs TwENTIETH CENTURY REAcnON 19-20 (1957); 
accord, AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 13, at 282. 
51 McKinley committed several thousand American troops to the international army 
which suppressed the Chinese nationalists and rescued western nationals trapped in 
Peking. The President was accused of usurping congressional power to declare war 
by a few democrats, but "since the legislature had adjourned before the crisis broke 
and since neither party desired a special session in an election year, these complaints 
produced no results." LEOPOLD at 117. For more detail, see id. at 215-18; ]. ROGERS, supra 
note 37, at 58-62. 
To an eJ.."tent, McKinley is vulnerable to a charge of unilateral war-making in his 
suppression of the Aguinaldo-led attempt to win independence for the Philippines 
during the years 1899-1902. According to Rogers, id. at 112, 126,000 Uuited States 
troops were employed in putting down the movement. The decision to insist that 
Spain surrender all of the Philippines to the Uuited States was made by the President 
alone, and Senate approval of the treaty of peace with Spain did not constitute a clear 
endorsement of American control of the islands. For discussion, see LEOPOLD at 150-52, 
180-88, 212. 
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avoid involvement in the struggles of the world's other great powers:;2 
-the pristine American psyche had been gravely offended by the taw-
dry aftermath of World War I. The mood of the country showed it-
self vividly when Japanese bombers deliberately sent an American 
gunboat, the Panay, to the bottom of the Yangtze River on December 
12, 1937. Quite unlike the popular reaction to attacks on the Maine 
and on destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf, the Panay incident gave immedi-
ate and tremendous impetus to a congressional attempt to amend the 
Constitution to subject war decisions to popular referendum, except 
in case of invasion. 53 
Congressional devotion to neutrality and to nonintervention in the 
affairs of other states, especially those in Europe, made intelligent use 
of American influence difficult during and after the First World \Var. 
Wilson's troubles in bringing American power to bear against Ger-
many, however, were minor compared to those experienced by Roose-
velt under far more desperate circumstances. 54 Both Presidents, but 
especially Roosevelt, were forced to resort to deception and flagrant 
disregard of Congress in military deployment decisions because they 
were unable to rally congressional backing for action essential to na-
tional security. 55 
52 Leopold states that Congress had few complaints about presidential use of force 
abroad during most of the interwar years. The placidity can be e}..]Jlained, 
partly by the peace which the United States enjoyed during this interlude and 
partly by the modification of its protectorate policy in the Caribbean. The 
republic did not fight any wars, declared or undeclared, and there was a 
marked reduction in the sort of police action that had been frequent before 
1921. Nor did the deployment of ships and men lead to congressional charges 
of presidential warmongering, as was the case after 1939. On one point the 
legislators continued to agitate. At every session, amendments to the Constitution 
were proposed to alter the war-making clauses. The most frequent were designed 
to halt profiteering, to bar using conscripts outside the continental United States, 
to require that a declaration of war pass each house by a three-fourths vote 
rather than a simple majority, and to hold a popular referendum, except in 
cases of invasion, before a congressional decision to go to war could take effect. 
LEOPOLD at 416-17. 
53 See id. at 416-17, 534. 
54 The Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936 and 1937 made no distinction between an 
aggressor and his victim; under the acts, Americans, especially the President, were to 
avoid any dealings which might involve the United States in another war. These laws, 
and the congressional and popular attitudes which they represented, placed a dis-
astrous limitation on Roosevelt's attempt to use American power and influence to head 
off the impending crisis. See the accounts in S. AoLER, supra note 50, at 239-73; 
LEOPOLD at 504-09, 526-28, 531, 537-42, 557-65. 
55 Among his major unilateral steps, Roosevelt in 1940 exchanged fifty destroyers for 
British bases in the Western Atlantic; in 1941 he occupied Greenland and Iceland, 
ordered the Navy to convoy ships carrying lend-lease supplies to Britain, and on 
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The trauma of the Second World War and of the Cold War led to 
a third stage in which Congress-in penance for its policies during 
the twenties and thirties and fearful lest its interference harm national 
securit:T6-left direction of foreign affairs largely to the President, with 
the exception of a period of uproar during the early fifties.57 As a 
rule, the legislators have presented no obstacles when the President 
wished to use force abroad, or to pursue policies likely to lead to its 
necessity. The Cold War has enjoyed bipartisan backing, both when 
the Executive acted wholly without congressional consentli8 and when 
he had authorization of sorts.59 The decisions to employ arms off For-
September 11 of that year declared, in effect, that henceforth the United States would 
wage an air and sea war against the Axis in the Atlantic. See the accounts in 
E. CoRWIN, supra note 39, at 22-34; LEOPOLD at 559·80; J. RoGERS, supra note 37, at 
122-23. 
After Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, \Voodrow \Vilson 
in 1917 armed American merchantmen and instructed them to fire on sight. The 
President had sought congressional approval but had been thwarted by a Senate 
filibuster. He proceeded nonetheless, though he later admitted that his course was 
"practically certain" to lead to United States involvement in war. Message to Congress. 
Apr. 2, 1917. 55 CoNG. REc. 102 (1917). 
56 One disquieting feature of the cold war was that perpetual crisis inhibited 
discussion. Criticism of the administration was apt to be interpreted as evidence 
of disloyalty; it was condemned as bringing aid and comfort to the enemy. The 
psychology of actual war-that of being either for or against one side-was 
applied to a situation that continued year after year. 
Al\mRICAN HERITAGE, supra note 13, at 287. 
57 A "Great Debate" over Truman's authority to send troops to Korea and \Vestern 
Europe raged for three months in early 1951, culminating in a Senate resolution calling 
for congressional authorization before the dispatch of further troops to fulfill NATO 
commitments. The attempt under Senator John Bricker's aegis to limit the scope of 
treaties and the use of executive agreements-to reassert a strong congressional influence 
in the shaping of foreign policy-came to naught in 1954, after Eisenhower made clear 
his unalterable opposition. See LEOPOLD at 660·61, 716-17. The hysteria bred by Senator 
Joseph McCarthy, playing upon frustrations and fears engendered by developments in 
China, Eastern Europe and Korea, came close to rendering Truman incapable of 
conducting an effective foreign policy during the latter years of his presidency. 
58 The Korean \Var, for example, was entered with no prior congressional authoriza-
tion, and never received even ex post facto blessing, perhaps because it was not an 
unpopular conflict at its inception. LEOPOLD at 683, notes that Truman's initial commit-
ment of naval and air forces was met with "some grumbling in the Senate about the 
war-making power," but that "[t]he House broke into applause on hearing the news." 
Senator Taft questioned the President's right to initiate the use of American forces 
without congressional approval, but, according to Leopold, "he blamed the method, 
not the move, and said he would have voted for armed intervention if that issue had 
been presented." ld. 
59 Eisenhower was authorized in January 1955 to use force if necessary to defend 
Formosa and its outlying islands, and in March 1957 to block communist aggression in 
the Middle East. A joint congressional resolution adopted in October 1962 authorized 
President Kennedy to use force if necessary to prevent the spread of communism from 
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mosa, in Korea, Lebanon, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam 
were essentially the President's, as were the policies that led. Washington 
to feel that force was essential. · 
Nonetheless, Congress has played an indispensable role in postwar 
foreign affairs. Without congressional willingness to back their poli-
cies, Presidents could have done little. Moreover, well aware that Con-
gress could at any time hamstring their initiative by refusing requisite 
legislation or appropriations, Presidents have consistently conferred with 
congressional leaders when shaping policy and have sought their advice 
-or at least informed them before the fact-when deciding to employ 
force abroad. The point, however, is that despite its latent power, Con-
gress has had little part in shaping American foreign policy over the 
last quarter century, particularly where questions of the use of force 
are concerned. Foreign aid may have been subjected to an annual blood-
letting but not the President's capacity to commit and maintain troops 
abroad. 
It is possible that a fourth stage is now developing in public and 
congressional restiveness over Vietnam. Whether a new era will come 
to fruition or die with the end of the present conflict remains to be 
Cuba or the development there of an externally supported military capability dangerous 
to the security of the United States. And President Johnson received in August 1964 
a joint resolution providing in part that ''the United States is . . • prepared, as the 
President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, 
to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 
requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." Vietnam Joint Resolution, 78 Stat. 
384 (1964). 
When force was used in Lebanon, in the Atlantic off Cuba during the Missile Crisis 
and in Vietnam, however, it was unclear to what extent the respective Executives 
based their action upon prior congressional approval and to what eA"tent upon claims 
of inherent presidential power. It seems likely that the three Presidents would have 
acted as they did, even without the resolutions. Eisenhower, in fact, did not claim to be 
acting pursuant to the Middle East Resolution when he intervened in Lebanon in 
July 1958, presumably because Congress had authorized force only when the attack 
came from a communist state. Johnson relied more heavily on the Gulf of Tonkin 
resolution, since in terms of its language it certainly authorized the war he waged. See 
the discussion in LEOPOLD at 792-96; Note, 81 HARv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1792-93. 
The executive interpretation of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution has been bitterly 
conteSted as a misreading of congressional intent. E.g., Velvel, supra note 2, at 472-79. 
The fact that this controversy could arise, however, points to a fundamental charac-
teristic of recent congressional participation in decisions regarding the use of force. 
With the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as perhaps the most egregious example, the acts 
in question have tended to be blank checks, leaving so much to presidential discretion 
as to vitiate their impact as anything other than demonstrations of national unity in 
time of crisis. See the discusssion in WoRMUTH at 43-53; Pusey, Tbe President and 
the Power To Make War, THE ATLANTic MoNTHLY, July, 1969, at 65; Note, 81 HARv. L. 
REv., supra note 2, at 1802-05. 
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seen. Should it come to fruition, it is difficult to determine whether it 
will be a return to nineteenth century collaboration or early twentieth 
century obstruction. Much will depend on Congress' ability to act de-
cisively and quickly and on the nature of its decisions. And much will 
rest not only on the willingness of the President to involve Congress 
in the making of foreign policy but also upon congressional insistence 
that he do so. 
The Factors Contributing to Presidential Ascendancy 
To talk of causation is always hazardous business. It seems, how-
ever, that the growth of presidential power over foreign relations60 has 
resulted largely from factors which can be grouped into three broad 
categories: historical developments; institutional aspects of the presi-
dency which have made it more responsive to these developments than 
Congress; and :finally, the greater willingness of many Presidents, than 
many Congresses, to exercise their constitutional powers to the fullest-
and perhaps beyond. Among the relevant historical forces, the most 
important three are the ever-increasing pace, complexity and hazards 
of human life. 61 To meet the heightened pace of contemporary events, 
a premium has been placed on rapid, decisive decision-making. To 
deal with the complexity of the times, government by experts-men 
with access to relevant facts and with the capacity to fashion appropri-
ate policies-has increasingly become the norm.62 To survive the recur-
rent crises, there is emphasis on leadership which is always ready to 
respond and which can act flexibly and, if necessary, secretly. More-
over, there is continual concern that government be able to implement 
effectively whatever policies it adopts. 
The presidency enjoys certain institutional advantages which make 
it a natural focus for governmental power, especially during times of 
rapid change, complexity and crisis. These advantages stem largely 
from the fact that the President, unlike Congress, is one rather than 
many. As a single man, always on the job, he is able to move secretly 
60 Executive control over domestic affairs has also increased, but presidential 
dominance in this area is notably less complete than in external matters. See Schlesinger, 
The Limits md Excesses af Presidential Power, SATURDAY REv., May 3, 1969, at 18-19. 
61 The increased pace, complexity and hazards have resulted from the demographic, 
technological and ideological explosion of the past hundred years. These factors have 
also produced a burgeoning interaction and interdependence among the peoples of the 
world. See note 19 supra. 
62 See Bracher, Problems of Parliamentary Democracy in Europe, 93 DAEDALus 179, 
183-85 (Winter 1964). 
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when the need arises, and to combine rapid, decisive action, with the 
flexibility in policy demanded by quickly changing developments. His 
singularity and continuity also facilitate long-range planning. Because 
he is at the center of an unsurpassed information network and because 
he is assisted by countless experts, 63 the possibility exists that his deci-
sions will take into account the complexity of the problems faced. As 
the Chief Executive, he has more leverage in implementing his deci-
sions that any other organ of government. These institutional ad-
vantages, though important in domestic affairs, are unusually significant 
in the conduct of foreign relations where unity, continuity, the ability 
to move swiftly and secretly, and access to up-to-date information 
are more often of the essence.64 
A second historical development fundamental to the rise of the presi-
dency has been the growing ability of the government to communicate 
directly with the governed. Beginning with an upsurge in newspaper 
circulation in the late 1800's and continuing with radio, motion pic-
tures and now television, the capacity of decision-makers to go di-
rectly to the electorate has greatly increased, providing a tremendous 
opportunity to mold public opinion. Heightened ability to communi-
cate directly with the people has redounded largely in favor of the 
President. As a single rather than a collective decision-maker, he pro-
vides an easy target for the public and the media to follow. As the 
country's chief initiator and implementor, rather than its leading de-
h'berator and legislator, he provides a more exciting and thus news-
worthy target. As the country's master of ceremony and the head of 
its first family, he commands attention. Walter Bagehot, in his cele-
brated treatment of the English constitution, adopted a phrase, "in-
telligible government,, which describes contemporary presidential 
government perhaps better than it did the constitutional monarchy of 
Victoria. Bagehot argued that the great virtue of a monarchy, as op-
posed to a republic, was that it provided the people with a govern-
ment which they could understand-one which acted, or so they 
thought, with a single royal will and provided a ruling family to whom 
63 For a discussion of the establishment, elements and functions of the Executive 
Office of the President, see C. RossiTER, supra note 21, at 127-34. 
64See THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 273-74 (C. Beard ed. 1948) (J. Jay); id. No. 75, 
at 319-20 (A. Hamilton). It has been frequently stated, by de Tocqueville and 
Woodrow Wilson among others, that the power of the executive grows in relation 
to a nation's involvement in foreign affairs. See .AMEru:CAN HERITAGE, supra note 13, 
at 265; C. RossiTER, supra note 21, at 85-86. 
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they could relate.65 The President provides intelligible government par 
excellence, and, unlike Victoria, he rules as well as reigns. A ware of 
their newsworthiness, Presidents seek to use it to further their ends. 66 
The presidential press conference, special address and grand tour have 
provided effective tools for winning public support for executive poli-
cies,67 especially those dealing with foreign affairs.68 
65 The best reason why Monarchy is a strong government is, that it is an 
intelligible government. The mass of mankind understand it, and they hardly 
anywhere in the world understand any other. It is often said that men are ruled 
by their imaginations; but it would be truer to say they are governed by the 
weakness of their imaginations. The natute of a constitution, the action of an 
assembly, the play of parties, the unseen formation of a guiding opinion, are 
complex facts, difficult to know, and easy to mistake. But the action of a single 
will, the fiat of a single mind, are easy ideas: anybody can make them out, and 
no one can ever forget them. 
W. BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CoNSTITUTION 30 (World's Classics ed. 1949). Bagehot ad-
mitted that there exist an "inquiring few" for whom "intelligible government" is less 
important, because they can handle the "complex laws and notions" of constitutional 
rule. Id. Presumably, the "inquiring few" constitute a significant portion of the pres-
ent American electorate. 
66 Theodore Roosevelt was the first President to appreciate fully and capitalize upon 
the Executive's appeal to the media. For an account of Roosevelt's use of the press, 
see AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 13, at 266-67. 
67 See C. RossiTER, supra note 21, at 33, 114-18. A French commentator has observed: 
[I]n the realm of information, the political system of the United States has a 
real institution unforeseen in the Constitution: the presidential press conference. 
The importance of the press conference as a test of the American Chief Executive 
has often been noted. It should be emphasized that the institution of the press 
conference makes the press the representative of pnblic opinion and gives to the 
press the role of intermediary between the citizens and their government which 
classic theory reserved to the legislature. It is characteristic that American 
senators and representatives often put their questions to the President by getting 
friendly or sympathetic reporters to ask certain questions at a presidential press 
conference. 
Grosser, The Evolution of European Parliaments, 93 DAEDALUS 153, 159 (Winter 1964). 
68 The foreign tour focuses attention on the President and, if successful, enhances 
his political stature, thereby promoting his policies. Inherent in most foreign relations 
pronouncements of the E.xecutive, particularly those dealing with the use of force, 
is an opportunity to "shield and enhance his authority by wrapping the fiag around 
himself, invoking patriotism, and national unity, and claiming life-and-death crisis." 
Schlesinger, supra note 60, at 18. John Kennedy's dramatic address to the nation on 
October 22, 1962, certainly ranks among the most effective uses of the media to rally 
support for a presidential decision to use force abroad. 
Far more than in domestic affairs, contemporary Presidents seem willing to argue 
their foreign policies directly before the people. Grosser, supra note 67, at 159, com-
ments: 
[T]he American presidential system, with the separation of powers, virtual direct 
election of the President and his nonparticipation in congressional debates, 
facilitiates . . . recourse to a means of disseminating information that bypasses 
the legislature; but the situation is a J.>henomenon of modern civilization and not 
of institutional machinery. ''The President from time to time shall report to the 
Congress on the State of the Union." The Founding Fathers certainly did not 
1268 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 55:1243 
A third force enhancing the position of the Executive has been the 
democratization of politics, 69 primarily a result of the way in which 
our political parties developed. While the party system has made in-
creasingly democratic the process of electing the President, and given 
him a natural role as the external leader of Congress, it has done little 
to facilitate decisive action by the legislators and has left them exposed 
to the play of special interests.70 The President rather than Congress 
has come to be seen as the symbol of national unity, as the chief 
guardian of the national interest, and as the most democratic organ 
of government.71 Consequently, the capture of the presidency has be-
come the primal objective of American politics. 
It was not unnatural that the focus of party politics became the quest 
for the presidency, particularly in view of its notable power and the 
Presidents' unusual capacity to provide the heroes and folklore needed 
to cement party followers and the country into a cohesive whole.72 
Nor was democratization of the presidential nomination and election 
processes an abnormal development, since the President, institutionally, 
is the sole politician with a national constituency. This reality was ap-
preciated and exploited first by Andrew Jackson, but received perhaps 
its classic statement from James K. Polk in his final annual message to 
Congress: 
If it be said that the Representatives in the popular branch of Con-
gress are chosen directly by the people, it is answered, the people 
intend this to mean only the annual message to Congress. In the Cuban crisis 
of October, 1962, a statement to Congress would have corresponded to the 
text of the Constitution, rather than a televised talk to the nation. 
69 See C. RossiTER, supra note 21, at 88-89. 
70 See C. RossiTER, PARTIES AND Pouncs IN AMERICA 17-24, 60-61, 62 (1960). 
71 E. CoRWIN, supra note 14, at 307, states in resume: 
In short, the Constitution reflects the struggle between two conceptions of 
executive power: that it ought always to be subordinate to the supreme legislative 
power, and that it ought to be, within generous limits, autonomous and self-
directing; or, in other terms, the idea that the people are re-presented in the 
Legislature versus the idea that they are embodied in the Executive. Nor has this 
struggle ever entirely ceased, although on the whole it is the latter theory that 
has prospered •••• "Taken by and large, the history of the presidency has been 
a history of aggrandizement." 
72 According to C. RossiTER, supra note 21, at 107, the great Executives are 
more than eminent characters and strong Presidents. They were and are luminous 
symbols in our history. We, too, the enlightened Americans, feel the need of 
myth and mystery in national life . . . • And who fashioned the myth? Who 
are the most satisfying of our folk heroes? With whom is associated a wonderful 
web of slogans and shrines and heroics? The answer, plainly, is the six Presidents 
I have pointed to most proudly. 
For a discussion of the folklore of the Presidency, see AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 
13, at 197-208. 
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elect the President. If both Houses represent the States and the 
people, so does the President. The President represents in the exec-
utive department the whole people of the United States, as each mem-
ber of the legislative department represents portions of them.73 
A fourth factor might best be termed good fortune-the frequent 
election of charismatic, far-sighted men to serve as President during 
times of great need. It is probably true that without crisis, it is diffi-
cult for a man to perform mighty acts. The converse-that given an 
emergency the incumbent Chief Executive will necessarily rise to meet 
it-does not hold. Some Presidents, so confronted, have been restrained 
by their concept of the presidency74 and some by their ineptitude. 
73 Quoted in AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 13, at 94. A 1966 statement by Lyndon 
Johnson seems to go beyond Polk. The President declared that ''(t]here ate many, many 
who can recommend, advise, and sometimes a few of them consent. But there is only 
one that has been chosen by the American people to decide." Schlesinger, supra note 
60, at 17. 
74 Presidents, like most other members of the American body politic, voluntarily obey 
its rules. Accordingly, their concept of the limits of their constitutional powers has 
a great beating on the action which they ate willing to take. It seems that presidential 
opinion has ranged widely, from the modest views of Buchanan to the brash inter-
pretations of Franklin Roosevelt. Taft stated the basic tenet of the former in these 
words: "The true view of the executive functions . • . is, as I conceive it, that the 
President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to 
some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such express 
grant as proper and necessary." Quoted in E. CoRWIN, supra note 14, at 153. Buchanan 
adhered rigidly to his concept of the limits of his powers, going so fat as to reject 
an 1860 Virginia proposal for a conference of states and, pending its conclusion, an 
agreement between the Secessionists and the President to abstain from violence. 
Buchanan strongly favored the plan but refused to act, stating: 
Congress, and Congress alone, under the war-making power, can exercise the 
discretion of agreeing to abstain "from any and all acts calculated to produce 
a collision of atms" between this and any other government. It would therefore 
be a usurpation for the Executive to attempt to restrain their hands by an 
agreement in regard to matters over which he has no constitutional control. 
Quoted in WoRMum at 12. 
At the other extreme, Franklin Roosevelt believed that he possessed constitutional 
power to act even in direct opposition to existing law, if an emergency so warranted. 
E. CoRWIN, supra note 14, at 251. His position resembled the executive "prerogative" 
formulated by John Locke "as the 'power to act according to discretion for the public 
good, without the prescription of law and sometimes even against it.' " Quoted in id. at 
8. Roosevelt's activities leading to United States involvement in hostilities with 
Germany in the Atlantic were of dubious legality, if not clearly contrary to law upon 
occasion. See E. CoRWIN, supra note 39, at 22-29. His September 7, 1942, dictate to 
Congress ordering the repeal of a certain provision of the Emergency Price Control 
Act was clearly in accord with the Lockian prerogative. See E. CoRWIN, supra note 14, 
at 250-52. 
Midway between Buchanan's and Franklin Roosevelt's reading of their constitutional 
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More Presidents than not, however, have provided the requisite leader-
ship~ with a corresponding increase in the power and prestige of the 
office.75 
Finally, there is a momentum to the President's burgeoning influence. 
With each new function that the Executive has assumed, with each 
crisis that he has met, with each corresponding rise in his prestige, in 
popular expectations, in presidential folklore and myth, the office has 
become more potent. The President's varied powers feed upon one 
another to produce an aggregate stronger than the sum of his individual 
responsibilities. 76 
Presidential control over governmental affairs has been matched by 
a decline in congressional influence. Although Congress remains a 
powerful body, far more so than the legislature of any other sizable 
nation, the times in which it was able to dominate public affairs have 
passed. The existence of two co-equal houses militated against its ever 
being able to assert complete supremacy, thereby relegating the Exec-
utive to a ceremonial role. Unlike the institutional characteristics of 
authority stands the "Stewardship Theory," described by Theodore Roosevelt in these 
terms: 
My view was that every executive officer ••• was a steward of the people . • •• 
My belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that 
the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the 
Constitution or by the laws. . . . In other words, I acted for the public wel-
fare . . • whenever and in whatever manner was necessary, unless prevented 
by direct constitutional or legislative prohibition. 
Quoted in id. at 153. Few today would deny that the President has at least this much 
authority. See id. at 147-58. See generally A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 5-13. 
75 See the discussion in C. RossiTER, supra note 21, at 89-114, 145-78. Arthur 
Schlesinger aptly notes that most advances in presidential power have engendered a 
counter-reaction, so that presidential aggrandizement has by no means been an un-
interrupted progress forward. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 15. 
76 As Clinton Rossiter lyrically noted, during an era when executive aggrandizement 
was viewed with greater tranquility than today: 
The Presidency • . . is a wonderful stew whose unique flavor cannot be ac-
counted for simply by making a list of its ingredients. It is a whole greater than 
and different from the sum of its parts, an office whose power and prestige are 
something more than the arithmetical total of all its functions. The President 
is not one kind of official during one part of the day, another kind during 
another part-administrator in the morning, legislator at lunch, king in the 
afternoon, commander before dinner, and politician at odd moments that come 
his weary way. He is all these things all the time, and any one of his functions 
feeds upon and into all the others. 
C. RossiTER, supra note 21, at 41. Rossiter breaks down the various functions presently 
in the Executive's preserve as follows: (1) five responsibilities clearly stemming from 
his constitutional duties: Chief of State, Chief Executive, Commander-in-Chief, Chief 
Diplomat, Chief Legislator, and (2) five additional functions that have evolved over 
time: Chief of Party, Voice of the People, Protector of the Peace, Manager of Pros-
perity, and World Leader. For a discussion of each, see id. at 16-41. 
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the presidency, those of Congress have not attracted power during 
times of rapid change, complexity and recurrent crisis. The multitudes 
who make up the two houses of Congress, their constitutional task of 
.deliberation and authorization, the decision-making process necessitated 
when many men are engaged in a legislative endeavor, and the di-
versity of the legislators' constituencies inevitably make Congress a 
more ponderous, public and indecisive decision-maker than the Presi-
dent, and one, it seems, in need of external guidance. 77 
Much of Congress' present eclipse, however, stems not from such 
inexorable factors, but rather from its own unwillinguess to reform.78 
Unlike many Presidents, who have made a studied effort to adopt 
procedures which would enable them to wield power effectively, Con-
gress has generally been reluctant to part with old ways, even at the 
cost of diminishing influence. Congressional decision-making pro-
cedures could be steamlined, its access to information and expert ad-
vice could be appreciably heightened, and its attention could be focused 
more on national problems and less on local and personal matters. 
Moreover, its regrettable public image could be improved by skillful 
use of the media. Latent congressional power to investigate, to set 
policy and to supervise exists should Congress choose to exercise it.79 
Beyond its inaction and image, the eclipse of Congress in this century 
can be attributed to its proclivity, when it does act, to make decisions 
unresponsive to the needs of the times. 80 Thus, a reversal of congres-
sional fortunes will require not only a capacity to act but also the 
ability to make sound decisions. 
Restraints on the Exercise of Presidential Power 
Powerful as he has become, the President remains bound by numer-
ous restraints. Fundamental limits on his action result from his own 
beliefs and from his own leadership ability. As noted earlier, the Presi-
77 Rossiter goes further to suggest that even when Congress does act effectively, 
the result frequently is to increase the power of the President, since the implementa-
tion of congressional policy must often be left to him. Id. at 87-88. 
78 See Kurland, supra note 2, passim. Kurland argues that the ultimate responsibility 
for congressional decline lies with the people and not the legislators, since the electorate 
is concerned far more with ends than means; thus the voters exert little or no pressure 
on Congress to see to its own institutional well-being, so long as presidential policies 
are popular. Id. at 635. Credence is given this argument by the sudden embarrassment 
of those elements in the academic community who found presidential prerogative quite 
satisfying until Viemam. See Schlesinger, supra note 60, at 17. 
79 See notes 165-77 infra and accompanying text. 
80 See Schlesinger, supra note 60, at 19. 
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dent generally acts within the law not so much because he fears the 
consequences of disobedience as because he voluntarily supports the 
system of which it is a part. Admittedly, when the question is the ex-
tent of his constitutional powers to respond to what he views as a 
threat to the country, an activist Chief Executive may find an un-
usually broad grant of authority. 81 But even if the President decides 
that a given course of action would be legal, it will fail miserably if 
he is unable to persuade82 those whose assistance is essential to gain 
support for it, for there are very few matters of consequence which 
can be wholly accomplished by presidential dictate. Though it is 
unlikely, for example, that his order to dispatch troops to a foreign 
conflict would be disobeyed, his power to keep the troops in the field 
for a sustained period rests on his ability to convince the country of 
the wisdom of his policies. Even should the Executive win initial sup-
port for his action, if it proves ill-advised his freedom to pursue the 
policy will be short-lived. 
Beyond these internal restraints lie a series of external limits. The 
President must be careful at all times to honor the bounds set by pre-
vailing standards of "private liberty and public morality." 83 Clinton 
Rossiter aptly states that "[i]f [the President] knows anything of his-
tory or politics or administration, he knows that he can do great things 
only within 'the common range of expectation,' that is to say, in ways 
that honor or at least do not outrage the accepted dictates of constitu-
tionalism, democracy, personal liberty, and Christian morality." 84 
Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam debacle can be traced in good part to the 
offense the war caused various elements in the country on these scores. 
Arguably, again in the wake of Mr. Johnson's experience, it seems 
that a contemporary Chief Executive must take almost equal care not 
to offend the public sense of taste and style. To overstep any of these 
bounds risks a loss of public support, which, once gone, is difficult 
81 See the discussion of Franklin Roosevelt in note 74 supra. 
82 See R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL PowER, THE PoLmcs oF LEADERSHIP (1960). 
The President of the United States has an extraordinary range of formal powers, 
of authority in statute law and in the Constitution. Here is testimony that 
despite his "powers" he does not obtain results by giving orders-or not, at any 
rate, merely by giving orders. He also has extraordinary status, ex officio, 
according to the customs of our government and politics. Here is testimony that 
despite his status he does not get action without argument. Presidential power is 
the power to persuade. 
!d. at 23. 
83 C. RosSITER, supra note 21, at 46. 
84fd. at 70. 
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to recover. An undercurrent of suspicion and even hatred of the Presi-
dent as a potential despot runs throughout American history;8;:; an 
administration which brings it to the surface for whatever reason sacri-
fices much of its future effectiveness. 
Other centers of power-both by what they do and what they might 
do-greatly restrain presidential action. Three competing institutions 
are particularly important: the federal bureaucracy, Congress and the 
judiciary. To in1plement his policies, the President must have the co-
operation of the civil and military personnel who actually operate the 
governmental machinery. Since most of the bureaucracy falls within 
the presidential chain of command, obtaining their obedience ought 
to be among his less pressing problems. Such, however, is not the 
case. While the move toward rule by experts has increased presidential 
power at the eA-pense of congressional, it has done even more to enlarge 
and strengthen the "permanent government." 86 Each incoming Exec-
utive, for example, inherits a mass of departments, agencies and com-
mittees, all committed to the expert conduct of foreign affairs. He di-
rectly appoints only the high command of most of these entities, and 
often has trouble controlling even his personal appointees. Feuds with-
in the executive hierarchy and deliberate refusal by high officials to 
implement presidential policies are not unknown. 87 
The President's difficulties with his own people are minor beside the 
problems he faces in persuading the permanent officials to cooperate. 
Most were in place before his administration took office and most will 
survive it. They may passively oppose presidential policy by exhibiting 
great reluctance to alter existing procedures and programs, 88 or they 
may actively seek to determine national policy by pressing forward 
their own plans. Since Eisenhower's famed warning against the military-
industrial complex, there has been increasing fear that iliis element of 
s::; All strong Presidents, no matter how grateful posterity might be, have awaken-
ed the strange undercurrent of hatred, the persistent fear that the Found-
ing Fathers had bequeathed a potential elective monarchy to the United States. 
The Kennedys were frequently referred to as a royal family, sometimes with 
affectionate mockery, more often with malice and suspicion. The latest example 
of the literature of antipresidential fantasy, Barbara Garson's pastiche MacBird, is 
bound by the same queer compulsion. Portraying Lyndon Johnson as the 
.\hcbcth-like assassin of Kennedy, it is a drama of monarchy and usurpa-
tion. • • • [l]t reveals obsessions akin to those of ••. bizarre bygone items ..•. 
Ali1ERICAN Hr:mTAGE, supra note 13, at 182. 
86 The term comes from A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 16. 
87 See, e.g., .Morgenthau, supra note 11, at 265-67. 
88 See, e.g., C. RossiTER, supra note 21, at 59-62; A. ScHLESINLER, supra note 13, at 
16-17, 94-97. 
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the permanent government may be shaping basic national policies.sn 
Even when the relevant parts of the bureaucracy attempt to implement 
presidential programs, they often fail for a variety of reasons, including, 
in some cases, incompetence. The diplomatic-military apparatus in 
Vietnam, for example, had only limited success in its good faith effort 
to realize Johnson's objectives. 
Difficult as the bureaucracy may be, a greater limit upon presidential 
power is Congress.90 In Richard Neustadt's words, we have "a govern-
ment of separated institutions sharing powers." 91 Thus, virtually all 
presidential programs and ventures require implementing legislation 
and funding. Unlike parliamentary executives, the President has no 
ultimate weapons, such as dissolution or excommunication from party 
ranks, with which to beat reluctant legislators into submission. As a 
result, an abiding concern of the Executive and his assistants is the likely 
reaction of Congress to their proposals and actions.92 
Legislators have a number of tools with which to restrain the Presi-
dent. Through legislation, they can restrict his options, hamstring his 
policies and, to an extent, even take the policy initiative from him.93 It 
has been suggested that Congress is presently attempting to control the 
Executive by qualified legislation more than in the past,94 and the 
movement headed by Senator Fulbright, if successful, would certainly 
89 It is not wholly accurate to describe the military-industrial complex as a part of 
the permanent government, for, broadly defined, it includes groups with no official 
or unofficial ties to the state. 
It is a vast, amorphous conglomeration that goes far beyond the Pentagon and 
the large manufacturers of weapons. It includes legislators who benefit politically 
from job-generating military activity in their constituencies, workers in defense 
plants, the unions to which they belong, university scientists and research organi-
zations that receive Pentagon grants. It even extends to the stores where pay-
rolls are spent, and the landlords, grocers and car salesmen who cater to cus-
tomers from military bases. 
The Military: Servant or Master of Policy, TIME, April 11, 1969, at 23. See id. at 
20-26; The Military-Industrial Complex, NEwswEEK, Juue 9, 1969, at 74-87; AllmRICAN 
HERITAGE, supra note 13, at 287-88. 
90 See C. RossiTER, supra note 21, at 49-56. 
91 R. NEUSTADT, supra note 82, at 42. 
92 [A]s I saw the executive branch in action, [i]t was haunted by a fear and at 
times an exaggerated fear of congressional reaction. The notion that the execu-
tive goes his blind and arrogant way, saying damn the torpedoes, full speed 
ahead, is just not true. I would say a truer notion is that the executive branch 
cowers day and night over the fear and sometimes quite an exaggerated and irra-
tional fear of what the congressional respouse is going to be to the things it 
does. 
A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 171; accord, e.g., Morgenthau, supra note 11, at 267. 
93 See Morgenthau, supra note 11, at 263-64. 
94 A. ScHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 17. But see Kurland, supra note 2, at 629-31. 
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reduce presidential freedom in foreign affairs.m; Through the power of 
the purse, the legislators can similarly limit the President. Although 
control of the purse has been virtually a nonpower in the hands of cold 
war Congresses when funds were sought for the military, present re-
luctance to embark on major defense spending and criticism of the 
military establishment:96 suggest that appropriations may emerge anew 
as a limiting factor. A few voices have even been heard to suggest that 
funds supporting troops in the field be cut-traditionally, an un-
thinkable position.97 
The power of congressional committees to investigate and oversee, 
as the 1967 Fulbright hearings indicate, provides a means of sparking 
national debate, molding opinion and thereby influencing presidential 
action. Activity within Congress can frequently focus outside political 
pressure and bring it to bear on the Chief Executive. Similarly, legis-
lators can work the political process privately as well, communicating 
quietly with the President to persuade him that his ideas are ill-advised 
or subject to great potential opposition. Congress can also work in 
tandem with rebellious elements in the bureaucracy to thwart presi-
dential initiatives. Remote though the possibility is, the President must 
remain aware of the congressional capacity to impeach him or to cen-
sure his conduct by resolution-a fate that befell Polk at the hands 
of a House disturbed by his role in initiating the Mexican War.98 The 
President is also continually hemmed in by the play of the political 
system-by sniping from members of the opposition party and by the 
demands and feelings of members of his own party.99 
95 On June 25, 1969, the Senate by a vote of 70-16 adopted the following resolutio14 
a modified version of the one Senator Fulbright had introduced almost two years 
earlier: 
Resolved, That (1) a national commitment for the purpose of this resolution 
means the use of the armed forces of the United States on foreign territory, or 
a promise to assist a foreign country, government, or people by the use of the 
armed forces or financial resources of the United States, either immediately or 
upon the happening of certain events, and (2) it is the sense of the Senate that 
a national commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action 
taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government 
by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of 
Congress specifically providing for such commitment. 
S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CoNG. Rr:c. S7153 (daily ed. June 25, 1969). For a 
further discussion of Congress and national commitments, see 48 CoNG. DIG. 193-224 
(1969). 
96 See note 1 supra. 
97 See note 21 supra. 
98 See note 48 supra and accompanying te:<.."t. 
99 C. RossiTER, supra note 21, at 62-64. 
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Finally, the Senate is constitutionally empowered to advise and 
consent to presidential treaties and appointments and has devised the 
power to delay and negate by .filibuster. These senatorial prerogatives, 
coupled with the power of Congress over the legislation and appropri-
ations necessary to implement the President's foreign policies, constitute 
the primary restraints on his action. 
To date, the courts have served more to enlarge the presidential pre-
rogative over foreign affairs than to restrain it.100 The one opinion 
directly treating the scope of presidential power to use force abroad-
an 1860 decision dealing with an 1854 reprisal against a small, stateless 
town in Central America101-took a broad view of the President's 
constitutional powers. Although given ample opportunity to speak in 
the Vietnam context, federal courts have uniformly refused to con-
sider whether the conflict is unconstitutional for lack of congressional 
lOOSee, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); 
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 
116-18 (1926) (dictum); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. I, 63-68 (1890) (dictum); C. RossiTER, 
supra note 21, at 56-59; C. RossiTER, THE SUPREME CouRT AND THE CoMMANDER IN 
CHIEF passim (1951). 
101 Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (No. 4186) (C.C.SD.N.Y. 1860). The court stated 
in part: 
As the executive head of the nation, the president is made the only legitimate 
organ of the general government, to open and carry on correspondence or 
negotiations with foreign nations, in matters concerning the interests of the 
country or of its citizens. It is to him, also, the citizens abroad must look for 
protection of person and of property, and for the faithful execution of the laws 
existing and intended for their protection. For this purpose, the whole executive 
power of the country is placed in his hands, under the constitution, and the 
laws passed in pursuance thereof; and different departments of government have 
been organized, through which this po·wer may be most conveniendy executed 
whether by negotiation or by force-a depattment of state and a depattment 
of the navy. 
Now, as it respects the interposition of the executive abroad, for the protec-
tion of the lives or property of the citizen, the duty must, of necessity, rest 
in the discretion of the president. Acts of lawless violence . . . cannot be 
anticipated ... and the protection, to be effectual or of any avail, may, not 
unfrequendy, require the most prompt and decided action. Under our system of 
government, the citizen abroad is as much entided to protection as the citizen 
at home. 
ld. at 112. 
Although Captain Hollins burned the town in question long after the alleged 
attack on United States interests, the opinion speaks, not of a reprisal, but of a 
rescue situation, and grants the President broad powers to respond quickly to save 
threatened citizens and their property. WoRMUTH at 22-24, 31-32, argues that the 
destruction of the town was strongly condemned by contemporaty public and con-
gressional opinion, and suggests that the Durand decision was an attempt by the 
judge, "a partisan Democrat, . . . to vindicate the action of a Democratic President." 
ld. at 32. 
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authorization.102 The possibility remains, nonetheless, that an activist 
court, convinced of the unconstitutionality of presidential action, could 
order the Executive to desist. President Truman's immediate acceptance 
of the Supreme Court's ruling in the Steel Seizure case103 suggests that a 
judicial command affecting the use of force abroad would be obeyed 
by the executive branch104-although perhaps not without great political 
cost to the Court and great stress upon our constitutional system. 
102 See note 7 supra. 
Ht3 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
IO 1 To a significant eJ..-rent, it is possible to equate a decision such as Y oungsto-W'Tl, 
which ordered the return to private management of domestic steel companies seized 
by executive command, with a hypothetical judicial decision ordering the President 
to withdraw troops from a conflict to which he has unilaterally committed them, un-
less he obtains immediate congressional authorization for their use. Both decisions 
affect American participation in foreign conflict. President Truman, for example, 
seized the steel mills restored in Y oungstovm because 
[a]ll the members of the Cabinet agreed ... that it would be harmful to the 
country and injurious to our campaign in Korea if our steel mills were allowed 
to close down. 'Ve were then not only trying to keep our forces in Korea, as 
well as elsewhere, fully equipped, but we had allies to whom we had promised 
arms and munitions, and whose determination to resist Communism might depend 
on our ability to supply them the weapons they so badly needed. 
H. TnuMAN, MEMOIRS, quoted in A. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY oF A CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 
CASE 9 (1958). The hYPothetical decision, should Congress approve the President's 
action, would have only the psychological effect inherent in a judicial declaration 
that the war had been unconstitutionally waged in the past. Should Congress refuse 
authorization and the President withdraw the troops, the decision would be instru-
mental in reversing presidential war policy. 
Although the decisions typified by Youngsto-wn and the hypothetical both have 
strong foreign policy overtones, presidential obedience to the former is more as-
sured. First, a Y oungst()-W7l decision will generally enjoy greater domestic political 
support. E.xecutive action the direct effects of which are felt primarily within this 
country will usually generate more political opposition than action whose principal 
effects are felt abroad. Thus, seizure of the steel industry is riskier for the President 
than waging war in Asia. Moreover, executive action which affects the well-estab-
lished rights of powerful individuals in this country is more likely to spark political 
backlash than action that impinges upon the more inchoate rights of less powerful 
persons. Since Congress is unlikely to bring an action against the President for in-
fringement of its right to participate in war decisions, the plaintiff in the hypothetical 
case would probably be a serviceman seeking to avoid participation in the conflict. 
See note 7 supra. Unlike the property rights at issue in Youngsto-W'Tl, a draftee or 
reservist's right to avoid involvement in an unauthorized war is not an interest that 
our legal system has traditionally recognized as worthy of protection. Further, the 
draftee's political power is miniscule compared to that of the steel magnate. Only 
when a series of draft cases has evoked significant moral and political condemnation 
do they begin to have a potential effect akin to Youngstown. 
Second, presidential disregard of a court order is more difficult when complianc(. 
requires action solely within the United States and the reversal of a course of action 
who.;~ substance has consisted largely of official proclamations. The steel mills, for 
1278 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 55:1243 
The ultimate restraint upon the President, however, does not come 
from his own beliefs and abilities or from competing centers of power, 
but rather from the activities of the electorate, which continually ex-
presses its views in various manifestations of public opinion, and periodi-
cally in federal elections.105 A President will fall from grace when his 
policies fail to meet popular needs and demands or when they involve 
him in activity which is widely viewed as illegitimate, because it trans-
gresses popular conceptions of legality or morality.106 An unpopular 
President and his supporters will ultimately be turned out of office, 
but before their dismissal, executive policies and personnel will have 
come back under attack from other centers of power, emboldened by 
the President's diminished popular standing.107 Attacks from these cen-
ters will~ in turn, further reduce popular confidence in the adminis-
tration. The President will find it increasingly difficult to govern, even 
in areas distantly divorced from those in which his actions have of-
fended the public.108 Once lost, the mandate of heaven is difficult to 
regam. 
example, could be returned to private ownership by an executive order rescinding the 
earlier seizure decree. It would be far easier for the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, to disregard or subvert an order to bring home hundreds of thousands of 
troops from a distant country. 
It is probable, however, that a President confronted with the hypothetical decision 
would seek congressional approval and, should it not be forthcoming, would like 
most other Americans, voluntarily obey the rnles of our society, including the one 
which places final authority on constitutional questions in the hands of the Supreme 
Court. Thus, unless the President felt that the security of the country was utterly de-
pendent upon prosecution of the war, he would be most unlikely to defy the Court. 
Moreover, even if the President were inclined to disregard its command, he would be 
restrained by knowledge that defiance could result in a constitutional crisis of dis-
astrous consequences both for the legitimacy of his administration and the stability 
of the country. 
105 Since the success of American foreign policy frequently depends on the actions 
of other states and their peoples, e:'i:ecutive use of force abroad is subject to their 
opinions and leadership selections, as well as to those of the American electorate. 
106 See notes 83-85 supra and accompanying text. 
107 These centers, of course, can act before public sentiment turns against the 
executive policies in question, and may be instrumental in effecting the shift. The 
Fulbright hearings, for example, led rather than followed public opinion. A. 
Scm.EsiNGER, supra note 13, at 106, does not believe that "there can be any question 
that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee opened up a national debate where one 
had really not existed before. The educational job performed by the senators on 
Vietnam has been quite extraordinary." 
lOS The Presidency is "an unwieldy vessel which can navigate only when it has 
built up a head of steam and is proceeding at a brisk speed. When the pressure is 
dissipated and the speed drops, the craft is at the mercy of the elements • • • ." 
AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 13, at 275. 
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In sum, during the last several decades the allocation of power be-
tween the President and Congress over the control of foreign relations 
has been heavily weighted in favor of the Executive. His hegemony 
has resulted from the interplay of a number of factors, most of them 
a result of the presidency's institutional advantages in meeting contem-
porary challenges and opportunities. Nevertheless, executive control 
over foreign policy is hardly without its limits, both actual and potential. 
THE BALANCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND CoNGREss: RuLES 
The Constitution 
With the foregoing overview of practice, it will be helpful now to 
consider e:\.-pectations-people's rule-based beliefs concerning the con-
stitutional scope of the President's authority-irrespective of the actual-
ities of his conduct. The appropriate place at which to begin such an 
investigation is with the language of the relevant constitutional pro-
visions which appear in articles I and II. They may be divided into four 
categories: grants dealing with foreign affairs as a whole; those con-
cerning specifically the military aspects of foreign affairs; grants of 
inherent, nonenumerated powers; and provisions providing the Presi-
dent and Congress, respectively, with weapons with which to coerce 
one another. 
In the first category, the President is modestly endowed, at least in 
terms of formal, stated grants of power. Generally, he holds the ex-
ecutive power of the Government109 and has the authority to request 
the executive departments to report to him, 110 as well as the power to 
nominate men to fill principal offices.111 He is enjoined to see that federal 
law is faithfully executed and to inform Congress periodically of the state 
of the nation112 and is authorized to present Congress with legislative 
recommendations.U3 More specifically, the President is empowered to 
make treaties and diplomatic appointments with the approval of the 
Senate,114 and he is commanded to receive foreign diplomats.115 
100 U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 1. 
110 !d.§ 2. 
111[d. 
112[d. § 3. 
113/d. 
114 [fhe President) •.. shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; 
and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, • • • and all 
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Congress has more extensive powers in this category. Generally, the 
legislators hold all the legislative power of the Government/16 includ-
ing the power over appropriations, the House having the privilege of 
initiating all money bills.117 More specifically, Congress as a whole con-
trols a wide range of matters with notable transnational impact, espe-
cially in an increasingly interrelated, interdependent world.118 Policies 
regarding such matters as foreign commerce often fuel international 
conflict. The Senate, in effect a third branch of government in foreign 
affairs, has the power to give or withhold consent on treaties and ap-
pointments.119 
In the second, specifically military category, presidential grants 
again lag behind their congressional counterparts. The Executive is 
simply named Commander-in-Chief, and given the power to commis-
sion officers.120 His appointment prerogative mentioned previously also 
comes into play in the military sphere. Congress, on the other hand, 
has a battery of responsibilities, including, inter alia, the power to raise 
and support the armed forces and the power to declare war.121 
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherw·ise 
provided for, and which shall be established by Law • • . . 
Id. § 2. 
11a "[H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public iVlinisters ... .''/d. § 3. 
116/d. art. I, §§ 1, 8. 
117 Id. § 7. 
118 The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and 
Excises, to pay the Debts .•• 
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; 
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations •.• 
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization •.• 
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the 
Standard of Weights and Measures .•. 
To establish Post Offices •.. 
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective vVritings 
and Discoveries .•. 
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Sca5, and 
Offenses against the Law of Nations .... 
ld. § 8. 
119 See note 114 supra. 
120 u.s. CoNST. art. II, §§ 2, 3. 
121 The Congress shall have Power To ..• provide for the common Defence ... 
To declare \Var, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules con-
cerning Captures on Land and Water; 
To raise and support Armies ••• 
To provide and maintain a Navy; 
To make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and Naval 
Forces; 
To provide for organizing, arming, aud disciplining, the Militia, and for gov-
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In the third category, inherent powers, the President comes into his 
own. \Vhereas article II, section I vests in him "the executive Power,'' 
article I, section 1 vests in Congress only those "legislative Powers 
herei11 granted." Moreover, while the legislative article is quite tightly 
drawn, the executive article, in Corwin's words, "is the most loosely 
drawn chapter of the Constitution." 122 Thus, the President can make 
a strong case that, as the holder of the executive power, he possesses 
residual authority to go beyond his enumerated powers to take what-
ever steps he deems necessary for the country's security. Congress, 
to the contrary, confronts a linguistic hurdle. Arguably, however, 
"herein granted'' is not an insurmountable barrier where foreign policy 
is involved.123 
In the final, coercive category, Congress regains its textual edge. The 
President can seek to bend the legislators to his will through the threat 
of veto and special session, 124 but Congress can virtually destroy him. 
Impeachment and censure remain remote possibilities, but hostile use or 
nonuse of legislative power is an ever present mode of persuasion. 
Such is the relevant constitutional language. It strongly suggeSts that 
both the President and Congress are to have a role in decisions re-
garding foreign policy, especially those concerned with the use of force. 
But, as suggested earlier, 12u the language provides minimal guidance in 
most concete situations; the grants are complementary and abstract, and 
occasionally fail altogether to speak t<f contemporary problems. 
Intent of the Framers 
Like their language the intent of the Framers is somewhat ambiguous. 
erning such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
States ••. 
To exercise ..• Authority over all Places purchased ... for the Erection 
of Fons, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and needful Buildings .... 
Jd. art. I, § 8. 
122 E. CoRWIN, supra note 14, at 3. 
/d. 
[\V)hereas "legislative power" and "judicial power" today denote fairly definable 
functions of government as well as fairly constant methods for their discharge, 
"e...,.ecutive power" is still indefinite as to function and retains, particularly when 
it is exercised by a single individual, much of its original plasticity as to method. 
It is consequently the power of government that is the most spontaneously 
responsive to emergency conditions; conditions, that is, which have not attained 
enough of stability or recurrency to admit of their being dealt with according 
to rule. 
123See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); 
M. J\kDouGAL, supra note 14, at 496-503; cf. id. at 492-96. 
124 u.s. CoNST. art. I, § 7; id. art. n, § 3. 
12G See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying te::\.-c. 
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The relevant provisions were written only after long discussion and 
much compromise-processes certain to breed confusion about the exact 
nature of the end product. As is the case where many views are ad-
vanced, and where the drafters do not know from past experience what 
demands reality will make upon their rules, much that the Framers 
adopted was left either vague or unsaid, to be filled in by practice. 
The Constitution's foreign affairs provisions were drafted against a 
background of legislative control of external matters in America/26 
and of executive domination in Britain.127 The Framers wished to alter 
the American practice to profit from executive speed, efficiency and 
relative isolation from mass opinion/28 without incurring the disad-
vantages of an unchecked British monarch. Thus, speed and efficiency, 
on the one hand, and restraint upon executive prerogative, on the other, 
appear to have been the basic objectives of the Drafters. Accordingly, 
they created an Executive independent from Congress/29 who was 
126 Prior to the installation of the Constitution on March 4, 1789, the direction of 
foreign policy was in the hands of a unicameral legislature which functioned 
through a Committee of Secret Correspondence (1775-7), a Committee for 
Foreign Affairs (1777-81), and the Department of Foreign Affairs (1781-9). The 
last was under a secretary who was responsible to the Congress. 
LEOPOLD at 67 n.l. 
127 Madison stated in 1793 that "'[t]he power of making treaties and the power of 
declaring war are royal prerogatives in the British government, and are accordingly 
treated as executive prerogatives by British commentators ... .' " Quoted in E. CoRWIN, 
THE PRESIDENT's CoNTRoL oF FoREtGN RELATIONS 21 (1917); see James Wilson's comment, 
I THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTioN OF 1787, at 65-66 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 
1937) [hereinafter cited as REcoRDs], and Hamilton's Analysis in THE FEDERALIST No. 
69, at 295 (C. Bearded. 1948) (A. Hamilton). 
128 The Framers seem to have been seriously concerned about the "temporary errors 
and delusions" of the people, their "passing popular whims" and "public passions.'' See 
THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 220 (C. Beard ed. 1948) (J. Madison); id. No. 63, at 268 
(J. Madison); id. No. 71, at 303 (A. Hainilton). Thus, they sought a check on mass 
opinion in a strong President, id. No. 71, at 303 (A. Hamilton), and in the Senate's 
"temperate and respectable body of citizens," id. No. 63, at 268 (J. Madison). See also 
id. No. 62, at 263-64 (J. Madison). 
129 The creation of an Executive, wholly outside the legislative sphere, was by no 
means a foregone conclusion when the Framers first met. C. RossiTER, supra note 21, 
at 76-79, suggests that among the crucial decisions taken in favor of a strong Executive 
were that the office would be separate from the legislature; that it would be held 
by one man, who would have a source of election outside Congress, and a fixed term 
subject only to impeachment; that he would be eligible for reelection; that he would 
be granted his own constitutional powers, and not be saddled with a council whose 
approval he would have to obtain for various actions; and that he could not be a 
member of either house of Congress during his presidency. For further discussion, see 
id. at 74-81, 87; AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 13, at 12-24; E. CoRWIN, supra note 14, 
at 3-16; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 6-7. 
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perhaps at his strongest in external matters. Simultaneously, they placed 
in both Houses of Congress and in the Senate alone powers designed 
to prevent unilateral control of foreign relations by the President.130 
Of the various grants of power to both the President and Con-
gress, the one most central to the present question is the congressional 
power to declare war. If there are constitutional limits on presi-
dential authority to use the military abroad sua sponte, this provision 
provides them more than any other.131 "The Congress shall have Power 
to . . . declare War . . . " could mean any of a number of things, 
ranging from a relatively meaningless authority to recognize an existing 
state of large-scale conflict132 to the authority to make virtually all de-
cisions regarding the use of force by the United States. 
It seems reasonably clear from proposals made and rejected at the 
Constitutional Convention, from debates there, subsequent statements by 
130 The Framers intended that the Senate share in the actual execution of certain 
aspects of our foreign relations. See E. CoRWIN, supra note 127, at 84-88; THE FEDERAUST 
No. 64, at 272-74 (C. Beard ed. 1948) (J. Jay); M. McDouGAL, supra note 14, at 436-
37, 557-59. But in the interests of practicality, the implementation of foreign policy 
came quickly to rest almost exclusively with the Executive. The legislators retained, 
however, a strong voice in shaping the policies to be implemented, especially regarding 
the use of force abroad. See notes 37-48 supra and accompanying text. 
131 The Framers also viewed congressional control over the raising and support of 
the military as a primal check on presidential use of force, whether at home or abroad. 
See, e.g., THE FEDERAUST No. 26, at 106-07 (C. Beard ed. 1948) (A. Hamilton); id. 
No. 41, at 177 (J. Madison). But with the establishment of a large standing military 
capacity, the assumption of world-wide defense commitments and a prevailing belief 
that presidential use of troops abroad requires bipartisan support in the interests of 
national security, the power of the purse has become relatively meaningless. See 
note 21 supra and accompanying text. In the wake of the disquiet induced by Viet-
nam, it is possible that Congress will once again use its control of appropriations as a 
check on the Executive, see text at notes 96, 97 supra, although it is unlikely that the 
President will ever be deprived of the mobile task forces which enable him to inter-
vene abroad on short notice. To use its power over the purse to restrain such action, 
Congress would have to demonstrate willingness to refuse funds to carry on an 
intervention once begnn, or to fund it ouly at the cost of other programs the President 
favors. 
132 Such recognition may have some effect. A formal declaration of this nature 
would effectuate certain legal results with potentially profound consequences. 
Treaties would be canceled; trading, contracts and debts with the enemy would 
be suspended; vast emergency powers would be authorized domestically; and 
legal relations between neutral states and the belligerents would be altered. But 
though there may have been a time when these changes in legal status were 
uniquely the result of the issuance of a formal declaration, this is clearly no 
longer true today. Countries have long engaged in undeclared hostilities which 
in terms of the effort involved, the impact on citizens, and the effect on domestic 
and international legal relations are often indistinguishable from a formally 
declared war. 
Note, 81 HAR.v. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1772 (footnotes Oinitted). 
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the Framers and from practice in early years that the Drafters intended 
decisions regarding the initiation of force abroad to be made not by 
the President alone, 133 not by the Senate alone, 134 nor by the Presi-
dent and the Senate, 135 but by the entire Congress subject to the signa-
ture or veto of the President. The Framers recognized the potentially 
momentous consequences of foreign conflict and wished to check its 
unilateral initiation by any single individual or group.136 Madison ex-
pressed this concern early in the Constitutional Convention: "A rupture 
with other powers is among the greatest of national calamities. It ought 
therefore to be effectually provided that no part of a nation shall have 
it in its power to bring them [wars] on the whole." 137 Foreign con-
flicts, since they involve the entire nation, are to be begun only after 
both legislative houses and the Executive have been heard, even at the 
cost of some delay in reaching a decision.138 
133 Mr. Butler, apparently the only proponent of his view, favored "vesting the power 
in the President, who will have all the requisite qualities [e.g., dispatch, continuity, 
unity of office] and will not make war but when the Nation will support it." II REcoRDs 
318. 
134 Mr. Pinkney opposed the vesting of this power in the Legislature. Its pro-
ceedings were too slow. It wd. meet but once a year. The Hs. of Reps. would 
he too numerous for such deliberations. The Senate would be the best de-
pository, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper 
resolutions. If the States are equally represented in Senate, so as to give no 
advantage to large States, the power will notwithstanding be safe, as the small 
have their all at stake in such cases as well as the large States. It would be 
singular for one-authority to make war, and another peace. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
135 Hamilton presented a plan in which the Executive was "to make war or peace, 
with the advice of the senate .... " I REcoRDs 300. 
136 See note 138 infra. 
137 I RECORDS 316. Madison was speaking to the possibility that individua1 states 
through their "violations of the law of nations & of Treaties" might bring foreign war 
upon the country as a whole. ld. The unfortunate consequences of war were alluded 
to by others among the Framers. Mr. Elseworth, for example, argued that "[i]t shd. be 
more easy to get out of war, than into it." ll REcoRDs 319. And Mr. Mason was "for 
clogging rather than facilitating war .... " ld. 
138 Objections were made to legislative involvement on this ground. See the com-
ments of Messrs. Butler and Pinkney, ll id. at 318. But the approach of .Mr. Mason 
proved more persuasive; he stated that he was "agst. giving the power of war to the 
Executive, because not [safely] to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so 
constructed as to be entitled to it." ld. at 319. 
Fear existed that if the President were given the right to wage war unilaterally, he 
might unwisely engage the country in ruinous conflict or use the existence of war to 
raise military forces with which to seize control of the country. Moreover, the Executive, 
like the Senate, was not directly elected, and thus lacked the moral authority to 
commit the entire country to so potentially devastating a course. The House of 
Representatives possessed the legitimacy given by direct election, but, due to its cl.o~e 
ties to the general public, was suspected of flighty judgment. Accordingly, the 
1969] Presidential TV ar-iHaking 1285 
The discussion to this point has been of Congress' power to initiate 
the use of force abroad-to take the country from a state of peace to 
one of war. When, however, war is thrust upon the United States by 
another power, the Framers apparently intended that there be unilateral 
presidential response if temporal exigencies do not permit an initial re-
sort to Congress.139 Under such circumstances, there is no longer a need 
for check and deliberation; all reasonable men would agree that the sur-
vival of the nation is worth fighting for; speedy and effective defense 
measures are the constitutional objectives given a direct attack upon 
the country.14° Congressional involvement comes at a later point; as 
soon as feasible, the legislators are to be given an opportunity to ratify 
past presidential actions and authorize future conduct.141 
Although the Framers did not delineate what constitutes a thrust 
of conflict upon the United States, it appears that any direct, physical 
assault upon American territory will suffice.142 Moreover, if a blow 
Representatives' passions were to be controlled by involving the Senate and President 
in war decisions. Involvement of the Senate, moreover, would ensure that force could 
not be initiated abroad unless a majority of the states agreed. In short, an attempt was 
made to devise a scheme in which war would be entered upon ouly after measured 
deliberation, thus avoiding involvement in conflicts where the costs, upon reflection, 
appeared to outweigh the gains, or where the primary "gains" would be executive 
aggrandizement or the satiation of popular passion. These checks were intended to 
insure that the fighting would be supported by most Americans, thus avoiding 
disastrons internecine struggle within the country over war policy. 
130 The Framers initially intended to grant Congress the power "to make" war, as 
opposed to declaring it. In due course, however, "Mr. M[adison] and Mr. Gerry 
moved to insert 'declare,' striking out 'make' war; leaving to the E.'(ecutive the power 
to repel sudden attacks." The motion passed, though it had failed upon an earlier vote. 
ld. at 318-19, 313. vVhat precisely those who voted in favor of the change intended 
is difficult to say in light of existing information, but it does seem clear that the amend-
ment was not even remotely designed to empower the Executive to initiate hostilities. 
See WoRl\IUTH at 3-4; Note, 81 HARV. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1773 n.16. Compare 
a provision temporarily inserted by the Committee of Style, which stated that "[n]o 
State, without the consent of the Legislature of the United States shall • • • engage 
in any war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or the danger of invasion 
shall be so imminent, as not to admit of a delay, until the Legislature of the United 
States can be consulted." II REcoRDS 577. 
140 Arguably, under such circumstances constitutional procedures are superceded by 
an inherent right of the country, as a sovereign state, to protect its territorial integrity 
against foreign attack. Since the President is generally the citizen most able to galvanize 
a defensive reaction, he acts. Language in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936), lends a measure of judicial support to this con-
tention. See also M. McDouGAL, supra note 14, at 496-503; L. SMITH, AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY PowER 291-92 (1951); Note, 81 HARV. L. REv., supra note 2. 
at 1778. 
141 See notes 41-42, 46-47 supra and accompanying te:o.:t. 
142 "Polk's action set a precedent for also viewing as 'war' the invasion of disputed 
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is clearly imminent, the Executive need not wait for it to' fall. Arguably, 
the change in world conditions since 1789-the end of our geographical 
.immunity, the revolution in military technology and the new balance 
of power143-permits unilateral executive reaction to a sudden attack 
on a foreign state deemed essential to our security. Accordingly, a 
declaration of war by a foreign power of only paper force would not 
justify unilateral presidential response, 144 but the launching of nuclear 
weapons aimed at American cities would, even before the missiles reach-
ed their targets.145 Perhaps a sudden assault upon Canada or West Ger-
many would similarly justify immediate executive action. 
The President obviously must be the one who determines when a 
thrust is in progress which justifies his unilateral response.146 His 
judgment, however, may be repudiated when the matter is later placed 
before Congress.147 Such repudiation, in the face of genuine enemy at-
:tack, is most unlikely; virtually all citizens will agree that the survival 
,of the country is worth the price of conflict, and Congress will general-
ly be far more prone to attack a President who fails to defend the 
nation, than one who responds vigorously. 
Defense of the country, however, is not synonymous with offensive 
action against the attacker, though admittedly there is no clear line 
territory claimed under a treaty of annexation." Note, 81 HARv. L. REv., supra note 2, 
at 1781. 
143 See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text. 
144 For Franklin Roosevelt's response to declarations of war against the United 
States by Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania at the outset of American involvement in 
World War II, see Note, 81 HARV. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1781. 
145 The sudden and provocative establishment of offensive weapons by an unfriendly 
state on the territory of an ally located near the United States might justify immediate 
preventive action by the President-for example, John Kennedy's response to the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in 1962. 
146 Absent such presidential discretion, the "sudden attack" exception to the necessity 
for prior congressional approval of hostilities would become meaningless. The excep-
tion assumes that the country is presented with an accomplished fact and with the 
need to respond before Congress could reasonably be expected to act. Mr. Justice 
.Grier stated in 1863 that 
If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only 
authorized but bound to resist force b:y force. He does not initiate the war, 
but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative 
authority .••• 
This greatest of civil wars was not gradually developed • • • . [I]t nevertheless 
sprung forth suddenly •••• The President was bouncf to meet it in the shape it 
presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and 
no name given to it by him or them could change the fact. 
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668-69 (1863). 
147 See note 48 supra. 
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between the offensive and the defensive. Under the Framers' rationale, 
rapid response should give way to check and deliberation once the 
country is secure from the prospect of immediate physical assault.148 
The nature of the Executive's defensive measures will depend upon 
the nature of the thrust, but at no time should his response be dispropor-
tionate to the assault. Should he be responding to a nuclear attack, 
presumably there would be little or no distinction between de-
fensive and offensive action-the exchange would likely be terminal for 
both parties. But should enemy submarines shell coastal cities with 
conventional ordinance, the President need only clear the coasts of 
enemy ships; the launching of SAC and invasion of the enemy home-
land ought to await congressional authorization. In sum, the Executive 
does not receive full war-time powers simply because another state 
has directly assaulted American territory. 
While the President under the Framers' rationale can always respond 
to sudden attacks upon United States territory, and arguably upon the 
148 President Jefferson refused to take offensive measures during the First Barbary 
War until Congress approved them. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. 
Faced with a declaration of war by Tripoli and its attacks on American ships, he 
stated in his message to Congress of December 8, 1801, that "[u]nauthorized by the 
Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense, the 
vessel [a Tripolitan cruiser which had attacked a United States schooner], being dis-> 
abled from committing further hostilities was liberated with its crew. The Legislature: 
will doubtless consider whether, by authorizing measures of offense also, they will place: 
our force on an equal footing with that of its adversaries." Quoted in E. CoRWIN,. 
supra note 127, at 132. Alexander Hamilton replied heatedly that "it is the peculiar and: 
exclusive province of Congress, when the nation is at peace to change that state into ru 
state of war; ••• in other words, it belongs to Congress to go to War. But when a 
foreign national declares, or openly and avowedly makes war upon the United States, 
they are then by the very fact already at war, and an declaration on the part of 
Congress is nugatory; it is at least unnecessary." Quoted in id. at 134. 
One writer understands Hamilton's position to have been that "[a]s long as the 
United States is not the initial aggressor, the President's actions will remain 'defensive' 
requiring no further congressional action to enable him to continue to wage the war 
thrust on the country." Note, 81 HARV. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1779-80 (footnote 
omitted). In other words, once the Executive has beaten off an enemy assault, he then 
has discretion to take offensive measures. If this was Hamilton's position, it seems to be 
at odds with that of the Framers; they intended the process of check and deliberation 
to precede decisions to use force except when force was used to repel sudden attacks. 
When the whole of Hamilton's reply is considered, however, his primary complaint 
appears to have been with Jefferson's bizarre understanding of what constitutes de-
fensive action. See E. CoRWIN, supra note 127, at 133-35. On this score, the merits 
are clearly against the President's release of an enemy ship and crew captured in the 
process of attacking an American vessel. vVhile the Framers did not intend the 
Executive to take aggressive action on his own initiative, it is not at all plausible that 
they intended his defensive action to be ~o \)Otentially self-defeating. 
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territory of states absolutely vital to our security,. the Drafters did not 
intend unilateral presidential response to threats to American interests 
or citizens abroad, except under the most modest circumstances. As 
the constitutional provision granting Congress control over letters of 
marque and reprisal suggests, 149 the Framers intended "war" to be a 
broad concept. Judging by early practice, it appears that war in the 
constitutional sense was deemed to arise when the United States decided 
to setde a dispute with another state by the use of military force. The 
Naval War with France, from 1798-1800, involved neither appreciable 
force nor complete rupture of relations between the combatants; it did, 
however, require and receive congressional authorization. 
Congress must be given an opportunity to say whether it finds the 
potential gains from the use of force worth the potential losses. The 
latter may be t\vofold.15° First, there are the physical and economic 
costs, and the diminished legal rights produced by war. Their extent de-
pends upon the scale of the fighting, the enemy's strength, his location 
and the harm to be inflicted on him. In any use of force today, unlike 
the nineteenth century, it is difficult to predict the ultimate price. What 
149 WoRMU1H at 6, states: 
Even before the adoption of the Constitution, American law recognized that 
it was possible to wage war at different levels. In 1782 the Federal Court of 
Appeals, the prize court established under the Articles of Confederation, ob-
served: The writers upon the law of nations, speaking of the different kinds of 
war, distinguish them into perfect and imperfect: A perfect war is that which 
destroys the national peace and tranquility, and lays the foundation of every 
possible act of hostility. The imperfect war is that which does not entirely 
destroy the public tranquility, but interrupts it only in some particulars, as in 
the case of reprisals. 
The framers of the Constitution accepted this conception and assigned the 
power to initiate both perfect and imperfect war to Congress, which was "To 
declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and makes rules concerning 
captures on land and water." 
(footnote omitted). 
150 Note, 81 HARV. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1775, defines war in the constitutional 
sense as having a "quantitative" and a "qualitative" aspect: 
There are two possible reasons for requiring [approval of hostilities] from 
the body most directly representative of popular sentiment. The first is that 
such a decision involves a risk of great economic and physical sacrifice not to 
be incurred \Vithout such approval. The second is that even in cases where no 
significant physical effort is likely to be required ..•• the very act of using force 
against a foreign sovereign entails moral and legal consequences sufficiently sig-
nificant to require an e:\."Pression of popular approval. . .. The first argues for 
a definition phrased in quantitative terms, which would require congressional 
action prior to engaging in "major" hostilities above a certain level of intensity. 
The second would result in a more comprehensive, qualitative definition which 
would forbid any use of force against a foreign sovereign without prior con-
gressional approval. 
(footnote omitted). 
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is initially intended to be a minor effort, perhaps involving only a 
bloodless show of force, can easily grow into a major war, even a 
nuclear one. Moreover, the world is today so interrelated and interde-
pendent in economic, ideological and security matters that any use of 
force is likely to have repercussions which cannot be reliably charted 
in advance. 
Second, there are the political and moral costs and the potential 
legal sanctions entailed in using force against another state. Since 
\-Vorld \-Var I there has been a steady move toward the complete out-
lawing of the use of force by international disputants, except in self-
defense. Heightened respect for national independence and self-de~ 
termination had led to the prohibition of one state's intervention in an-
other's affairs and to emphasis on collective control over armed enforce-
ment of international law-with an accompanying distaste for unilateral 
police action. Thus, many armed activities which would have been ac-
ceptable under nineteenth century standards of legality and morality 
are unacceptable today.151 Accordingly, even if a contemporary use of 
force to protect American interests involved little .fighting, it might be 
costly in terms of its violation of international political sensibilities, 
law and morality.152 Whether the cost is justifiable is a decision m 
which Congress should have a voice. 
Congressional authorization need not be by formal declaration of 
war: "[N] either in the language of the Constitution, the intent of the 
framers, the available historical and judicial precedents nor the pur-
poses behind the clause" is there a requirement for such formality, 153 
particularly under present circumstances when most wars are de-
liberately limited in scope and purpose.u;4 A joint resolution, signed 
151 The landing of military units in backward states to protect American property 
or citizens, though common in the nineteenth century, would be acceptable today-if 
at all-only in situations in which public order has wholly collapsed, with great 
resulting danger to United States citizens; American property would have to suffer 
unaided. Similarly, armed reprisals against states delinquent in their adherence to 
international law, though common in the 1800's, are precluded today in favor of 
peaceful means of dispute resolution. See note 9 supra. 
152 So Senator William Fulbright characterized the 1965 American use of force in the 
Dominican Republic. 111 CoNG. REc. 28374-79 (1965). 
153 Note, 81 HARv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1802. 
154 Although formal declarations of war are effective devices for rallying support on 
the home front, empowering the Government to take all necessary emergency 
measures and serving notice on the enemy and all the world that our goal is conquest, 
[t)here are ... numerous policy arguments why the formal declaration of war 
is undesirable under present circumstances. Arguments made include increased 
danger of misunderstanding of limited objectives, diplomatic embarrassment in 
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by the President, is the most tenable method of authorizing the use of 
force today.155 To be meaningful, the resolution should be passed only 
after Congress is aware of the basic elements of the situation, and 
has had reasonable time to consider their implications. The resolution 
should not, as a rule, be a blank check leaving the place, purpose and 
duration of hostilities to the President's sole discretion. To be realistic, 
however, the resolution must leave the Executive wide discretion to 
respond to changing circumstances. If the legislators wish to dele-
gate full responsibility to the President, it appears that such action 
would be within the constitutional pale so long as Congress delegates 
with full awareness of the authority granted.156 
Since the Constitution was ratified, there have been countless mani-
festations of expectations that decisions to initiate the use of military 
force abroad must meaningfully involve the legislators. Presidents prior 
to 1900 generally held such expectations themselves and acted accord-
ingly, and twentieth century Executives prior to the Cold War 
frequently gave the concept verbal support, though their conduct 
often belied their words.157 Many members of Congress, particularly in 
recognition of nonrecognized ••• opponents, inhibition of settlement possibilities, 
the danger of widening the war, and unnecessarily increasing a President's 
domestic authority. Although each of these arguments has ..• merit, probably 
the most compelling reason for not using a formal declaration ••• is tfiat there 
is no reason to do so. As former Secretary of Defense McNamara has pointed 
out "[T]here has not been a formal declaration of war-anywhere in the world-
since World War II." 
Moore, supra note 2, at 33 (footnote omitted). 
155 Senate approval of a treaty would not suffice, as that would exclude the House 
from the decision-making process. An executive agreement, approved by the entire 
Congress and specifically described as authorization to use force, should be acceptable. 
Similarly, legislation to increase the size of the armed forces or to appropriate addi-
tional money to sustain a use of force might be regarded as authorization if legislative 
intent to that effect is made abundantly clear. Absent such clarity, simple legislation 
ought not to be regarded as implied approval, since it may have been adopted for 
reasons other than to ratify a presidential fait accompli. See note 21 supra and ac-
companying text. Nothing can be assumed from a congressional failure to act. The 
burden is not upon Congress to make its views clear or be deemed to have acqui-
esced, but rather upon the President to obtain legislative approval before he acts. 
See E. CoRWIN, supra note 39, at 152-53; WoRMUTII at 33; Velvel, supra note 2, at 455-56, 
465-68; Note, 81 HARv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1798-1803. 
156 The eJ~.1:ent to which Congress may constitutionally delegate its war power to 
the President has been a matter of some controversy in the past. In the wake of 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936}, however, it seems 
unlikely that strict anti-delegation rules apply in the foreign conteJ~.1:. See Moore, 
supra note 2, at 34. But see WoRMum at 43-58. 
157 See E. CoRWIN, supra note 14, at 201-02. See the collection of presidential state-
ments in Putney, supra note 49, at 6-30. 
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the Senate, and much of the general public retain a view that the 
Constitution requires congressional involvement in decisions to initiate 
conflict abroad. 
Constitutional argument in favor of the present high state of presi-
dential prerogative has, as a rule, not frontally attacked these e:l>.'Pecta-
tions. Rather, doctrinal justification for presidential practice, when of-
fered, has tended to ignore the constitutional grants to Congress108 and 
to read e:l>.'Pansively the complementary provisions applicable to the 
Executive. The broad interpretation has been dictated, it is said, by the 
demands of national security. Accordingly, the President's powers 
have been rolled into one ill-defined, mutually supportive bundle and 
used to justify presidential authority to do virtually "anything~ any-
where, that can be done with an army or navy." too 
158 A notable exception has been the expansive reading of the "sudden attack" 
exception. One writer argues that in the event of a direct attack, the President need 
not obtain prior congressional approval, even though he has sufficient time to do so. 
Significantly, however, in instances cited for support-First Barbary, Mexican and 
Civil Wars-authorization was sought and received concurrently with or immediately 
after the President's action. Note, 81 HARv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1779-81, 1783, 
1784 n.69. With regard to the place of the attack, a good case can be made that 
under present conditions, the enemy activity need not directly affect United States 
territory, if it poses a threat to American territorial integrity. Compare id. at 1782-85, 
with Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International 
Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 359-65 (1955). Finally, regarding the nature of the 
presidential response, it has been argued, particularly in the wake of the Prize Cases, 
67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863), that the President possesses full power to conduct the 
hostilities as he sees fit, once war is thrust upon the United States. Under this view 
it becomes important to determine when an enemy assault constitutes "war," lest presi-
dential powers be unleashed too readily. See Note, 81 HARV. L. REv., supra, at 1778-82. 
But as contended earlier, see note 148 supra and accompanying text, it does not appear 
that the President receives unilateral authority to do more than stifle an enemy attack. 
If such is the case, there is no need to haggle over when an attack is and when it is 
not war," since the President never enjoys unilateral authority to escalate the conflict. 
159 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641-42 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring); see Velvel, supra note 2, at 453-72. 
The President as the enforcer of the law is deemed to have constitutional authority 
to implement treaties, international law and the basic foreign policy objectives of the 
United States. See, e.g., E. CoRWIN, supra note 14, at 194-204; E. CoRwiN, supra note 
127, at 142-63; M. McDouGAL, supra note 14, at 487; 3 W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CoN-
STITUTIONAL LAw oF THE UNITED STATES 1567 (2d ed. 1929); Banks, Steel, Sawyer, and 
the Executive Power, 14 U. PITT. L. REv. 467, 506-16 (1953); Mathews, supra note 158, 
at 360-61, 363-65, 366-69; Note, 81 HARv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1776-77, 1787-94. The 
President's constitutional role as the country's foremost diplomat has been read to 
include control over both the conduct and the shaping of our foreign relations. See, 
e.g., the discussion in AMEiuCAN HERITAGE, supra note 13, at 276-78; E. CoRWIN, supra 
note 14, at 170-226; E. CoRWIN, supra note 127, at 1-32; M. McDouGAL, supra note 14, 
at 435-41, 487-92, 557-60; C. RossiTER, supra note 21, at 90-91; Foley, Some Aspects of 
1292 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 55:1243 
THE PRESENT CoNSTITUTIONAL BALANCE BETWEEN PREsiDENT AND 
CoNGRESS 
Constitutional law is most certain when peoples' expectations about 
the nature of constitutional behavior are actually realized in the con-
duct of public affairs160-when the constitutional rules governing the 
President's use of force abroad are given effect. Without such realiza-
tion in practice, rule-based expectations about the scope of presidential 
authority are quixotic; without adherence to the rules, the Executive's 
practice is simply the illegitimate exercise of power. As suggested/61 
the ultimate goal of constitutional interpretation is constitutional law 
-both rule and practice-which serves the long-term best interests of 
the country. Thus, it is ill-advised to promote constitutional rules whose 
implementation would not meet contemporary needs, just as it is ill-
advised to promote practices which needlessly flout the rules. 
The previous discussion has demonstrated that practice with regard 
to the use of American troops abroad has been varied. Certainly, how-
ever, presidential action immediately before the two World "\iV ars 
and during the last twenty-five years provides precedent for plenary 
executive control. The factors which have seemed to necessitate this 
practice, and its existence over a significant period of time, have 
naturally broadened expectations about the scope of the President's 
authority. It is doubtful, however, that most people now believe that 
the Constitutional Powers of the President, 27 A.BA.J. 485, 487-88 (1941); Mathews, 
supra note ISS, at 362-63, 366, 369-70; Morgenthau, supra note 11, at 264-65; Note, 81 
HARV. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1777-78. As Commander-in-Chief, the Executive has 
constitutional authority to do whatever he feels necessary for the defense of the 
country. See, e.g., the analysis in E. CoRWIN, supra note 14, at 227-62; M. McDouGAL, 
supra note 14, at 485-87; C. RossiTER, supra note 21, at 24-25; W. WILLOUGHBY, supra, at 
1567-68; Foley, supra, at 485-87; Jones, The President, Congress, and Foreign Relations, 
29 CALIF. L. REv. 565, 575-83 (1941); Mathews, supra note 158, at 352-65. The fact that 
he holds the executive power has been treated as confirmation of his plenary authority 
over foreign affairs; if his enumerated powers are found wanting in constitutional 
weight, his inherent authority as Chief Executive is thought to flesh them out as 
required. See, e.g., E. CoRWIN, supra note 14, at 3-16, 147-58; M. McDouGAL, supra note 
14, at 487-92; C. RossiTER, supra note 21, at 36, 78-79, 147, 259; C. RosSITER, supra note 
100, at 65-77; ]. SMITH & C. CoTTER, PowERS OF THE PREsiDENT DURING CruSEs 4-13, 
125-46 (1960); W. WILLOUGHBY, supra, at 1567-68; Banks, supra, at 499-502, 516-22; 
CoRWIN, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick without Straw, 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 53 
(1953); Foley, supra, at 485, 488-90; Gibson, The President's Inherent Emergency Powers, 
12 FED. B.]. 107 (1951); Jones, supra at 565-67, 575-83; Mathews, supra note 158, at 
381-85; Note, 81 HARv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1775-76, 1792-94. 
160 See notes 27, 29-31 supra and accompanying text. 
161 See note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
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the President is entitled to initiate foreign wars sua sponte. The general 
public takes a relatively blackletter view of the Constitution/62 and 
unless there is pressing need for its amendment, popular understand-
ing of the rule of law dictates adherence to provisions whose language 
and initial intent seem clear. The power vested in Congress to declare 
war is a primal instance of such a provision. Even the strongest sup-
porters of presidential prerogative would likely prefer to have congres-
sional approval of American involvement in foreign war-if only 
they were confident that Congress would vote wisely. Accordingly, 
it is important to determine whether the present degree of presidential 
control over the use of force abroad is essential to long-term national 
interests, and is therefore the constitutional order that must prevail 
irrespective of countervailing expectations. 
The primary argument for sanctification of present practice centers 
on past congressional inability to cope with questions of foreign policy, 
particularly those concerned with the use of force.163 Fault can be 
found with the congressional decision-making process; it is too un-
informed and inexpert, too indecisive and inflexible, overly public, al-
most always too slow and sometimes out-of-session when crises arise. 
There is also grave doubt as to the wisdom of the policies that would 
be generated even by a smoothly functioning legislative decisional 
process, particularly in light of the disastrous congressional approach to 
foreign affairs between World Wars. 
The factors behind the contemporary strength of the presidency, 
noted above,164 are relevant to the question whether Congress might 
regain some of its lost influence over foreign affairs without harm to 
national security. Thus, inquiry must determine the extent to which 
the present balance of power has resulted from the tendency of both 
Congress and the Executive to follow the path of least resistance, car-
ried along by the interplay of their institutional characteristics and cer-
tain historical forces, and whether it exists because national security 
requires presidential hegemony. The more the latter is the case, the 
more any rules requiring meaningful congressional participation in de-
cisions to use force abroad should be discarded. Conversely, the more 
162 See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text. Opposition to presidential policies in 
Vietnam has undoubtedly played a part in rekindling expectations that Congress is 
constitutionally entitled to a meaningful voice in American decisions to go to war. 
See note 78 supra. 
163 See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text. 
164 See note 80 supra and accompanying tell.'1:. 
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presidential practice appears needlessly to have diverged from the rules, 
the greater the need for strenuous effort to bring it back into line. 
At the outset, it must be readily admitted that no easy distinctions 
can be made between the path of least resistance and the security 
interests of the nation. Once any practice has developed in a reason-
ably efficient manner, any change will involve the costs of establishing 
new patterns and will risk the creation of a less viable order. The latter 
possibility is of particular concern in the present context. 
Of the historical forces contributing to the existing allocation of 
power between the President and Congress, none has been more im-
portant than the increased pace, complexity and danger of the times. 
The President, who singly holds his office, who has unsurpassed ac-
cess to information and experts, and who is always on the job, has 
been more able to meet current demands than has Congress, with its 
many men in office, inferior access to information and experts, and 
frequent inability to assemble its members quickly. It has been sug-
gested that for these reasons Congress is inherently incapable of par-
ticipating effectively in decisions regarding the use of troops abroad. 
Such is not necessarily the case. To the extent that Congress' prob-
lem is its indecisive, inflexible, slow and noncontinuous decision-mak-
ing process, improvement is possible. Legislators need to decide to act 
and to do so with reasonable dispatch. They need to restructure pro-
cedures such as the seniority system which now serve to clog debate and 
decision. When speed is of the essence,l65 the President can respond 
and then place the issue before Congress. It is questionable, however, 
that great speed is required in most decisions regarding the use of force. 
With the possible exceptions of Korea and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
its necessity during the last twenty-five years has been exaggerated. 
Even in the Korean situation, congressional authorization could have 
been obtained since Congress was in session and the legislators are 
capable of rapid action when confronted with an act such as the 
North Korean invasion. In the Cuban situation, the President's re-
luctance to involve Congress appears to have been a fear of exposing 
the nature of the American response before it could be sprung full-
blown on the unsuspecting Soviets, rather than a lack of time. 
To the extent that Congress' problem stems from its inability to 
operate secretly, a defect precluding access to certain information and 
participation in highly sensitive decisions, existing procedures for exec-
165 See note 140 supra and accompanying text and note ISS supra. 
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utive session could be further developed. The inclusion of legislators 
in selected secret decisions, on the assumption that national secrets 
would not be divulged, is not without precedent.166 If secrets were in 
fact divulged, the practice could be abandoned. In situations such as 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, where it is felt that initial planning must 
take place while maintaining an outward appearance of normality, the 
President can either involve congressional leaders in the decision un-
der a procedure previously established by Congress, or simply make 
the decision unilaterally and present it to Congress for approval after 
the need for secrecy had passed. 
Cuban Missile Crises are rare. The secrecy argument usually arises 
in the conte3.."t of classified information. Even were such data not 
available to the legislators, it is questionable that their ability to make 
basic foreign policy decisions would be materially impaired. lnfor~ 
marion is frequently deemed secret by the executive branch for rea-
sons other than its inherent nature, and it has been suggested that 
ninety-five percent of the data needed to make an informed decision 
on most foreign policy issues can be found in The New York Times. 107 
Similarly, it is debatable that e3..'}Jerts must make the basic decisions 
regarding the initiation of hostilities. The determination that military 
action is in our national interests requires the setting of priorities 
in light of existing values. It is largely a political decision, and thus 
arguably less susceptible to resolution by diplomatic and military ex-
perts than by politicians, although e3..'Perts and relevant information 
are important to insure that the political decision-maker sees and un-
derstands the various alternatives and their probable consequences. 
Information and expertise are already available in the military and 
foreign relations committees of both houses. Cooperation of the exec-
utive branch would also be required, particularly regarding access to 
classified data. Once adequately buttressed by information and experts, 
Congress would be better prepared to make rapid, wise decisions and 
to avoid inundation and intimidation by the torrent of data and ex-
pert opinions flowing from the executive branch. 
106 See Note, 81 HARV. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1797 n.l43. 
107 As one who has had the opportunity to read .•• [top secret] cables at various 
times in my life, I can testify that 95 per cent of the information essential for 
intelligent judgement is available to any careful reader of The New York Times . 
• . • Sec:recy in d~plomatic .comi?unication is ~ostly re.quired to protect negotiating 
strategies, techmques of Intelligence collection, details of weaponary, and gossip 
about personalities .••. The myth of inside information has always been used 
to prevent democratic control of foreign policy • • . • 
Schlesinger, supra note 60, at 61-62. 
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A second historical force behind the power of the President has 
been the development of communication devices which permit direct 
contact between government officials and the electorate, and which the 
Chief Executive, as the most active, intelligible branch of government, 
has been able to exploit in an unsurpassed manner. Though Congress 
will never be able to compete with the President in manipulating the 
media to mold public opinion, it could greatly improve its present 
efforts. Whereas the President assiduously sees to his public image, 
Congress rarely employs professional image cultivators and seldom 
works to appear concerned and competent to deal with national prob-
lems.168 Accordingly~ the legislators' collective image tends to be one 
of a parochial and inefficient group, unduly concerned with trivia and 
self-interest, an image which could be dispelled in part by the use of 
professional public relations techniques and, more basically, by a \Vill-
ingness to grapple effectively with the country's problems. 
Committee hearings are one area in which the legislators could use 
the media to greatest advantage, as the 1967 Fulbright proceedings 
indicate. But before committee efforts can have their maximum polit-
ical and educational effect, they must be purged of the witchhunt aura 
imparted by past abuses. Responsible and civilized conduct of all com-
mittee proceedings would go far toward this end.169 
A third force behind presidential aggrandizement has been the 
democratization of politics in this country, rewarding the branch of 
government which seemed most representative of all the people and 
thus most concerned with the welfare of the nation. It may be argued 
that since the President represents all the people, he is entitled to rule 
by plebiscite, appealing directly to the public for support, and regard-
ing the legislature as a necessary evil. But such a view is compelling 
only if Congress is in fact an undemocratic body-as it was when 
malapportioned districts, excessive obeisance to the seniority system and 
undue devotion to local, special and personal interests were at their 
peak.170 Reapportionment, a move toward younger leadership and a 
168 See Kurland, supra note 2, at 635. 
1il9 See id. at 633. 
170 Congress was possibly at its lowest ebb as a representative body of the national 
interest at the turn of the century. See A.."\1ERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 13, at 270-71. 
The Editors of Americcm Heritage conclude that, over the long term, 
[i]f decisive leadership had been lacking in the White House, the United States 
might have become another sort of country, and an inferior one, pervaded by 
the spirit of what Emerson termed "village littleness." This is the spirit that 
infuses many of the activities (or inactivities) of Congress at its narrowest. It 
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growing concern with national problems preclude a dismissal of Con-
gress on these grounds today.171 Individual congressmen will always be 
somewhat more parochial than the President, as is appropriate for men 
who are the representatives of a part rather than the whole of the 
national electorate. 
A corollary of the plebiscite view holds that the President alone pos-
sesses the willpower to make the hard decisions required for a practicai 
foreign policy, 172 and that he alone is capable of persuading a reluctant 
electorate to support them. Congress~ out of both a prediliction for 
is e"--pressed in such legislative slogans as To get along, go along (go along, 
that is, with the rest) and Vote your district first. 
/d. at 372. 
171 Since all states, regardless of their population, have two representatives in the 
Senate, presumably it can be argued that the upper house institutionally will always be 
less representative than the President. See Morgenthau, supra note 11, at 268. It is 
doubtful, however, that Senators from small states are necessarily less responsive to 
national sentiment than their colleagues from large states. 
172 Dependence upon the President for an intelligent approach to the world is 
necessitated, it is said, by the failings of untutored public opinion. The point is worth 
developing in some detail, as it accounts for much of the fear of involving the people, 
via their representatives in Congress, too extensively in foreign policy decision-making . 
.Morgenthau, supra note 11, at 261, argues that 
there exists an inevitable incompatibility between the requirements of good 
foreign policy and the preferences of a democratically controlled public opinion. 
As de Tocqueville wrote with special reference to the United States, "Foreign 
politics demand scarcely any of the qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; 
they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it i.~ 
deficient .•• [A] democracy can only with great difficulties regnlate the details 
of an important undertaking, perservere in a fixed desi~, and work out its 
execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combme its measures with 
secrecy or wait their consequences with patience." The history of foreign policy 
conducted under democratic conditions illustrates the truth of these observations, 
\V. LrPPl\lANN, EssAYS IN THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 19-20 (1955), elaborates upon thi·; 
theme: 
E.xperience since 1917 indicates that in matters of war and peace the popular 
answer in the democracies is likely to be No .... The rule to which there art' 
few exceptions-the acceptance of the Marshall Plan is one of them-is that at 
critical junctures, when the stakes are high, the prevailing mass opinion will 
impose what amounts to a veto upon changing the course on which the govern-
ment is at the time proceeding. J>repare for war in time of peace? No. It is 
bad to raise taxes, to unbalance the budget, to take men away from their schools 
or their jobs, to provoke the enemy. Intervene in a developing conflict? No. 
Avoid the risk of war. \Vithdraw from the area of conflict? No. The adversary 
must not be appeased. Reduce your claims on the area? No. Righteousness 
cannot be compromised. Negotiate a compromise peace as soon as the oppor-
tunity presents itself? No. The aggressor must be punished. Remain armed to 
enforce the dictated settlement? No. The war is over. 
The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been destructively 
wrong at the critical junctures. 
See also, e.g., J. SPANIER, AMERICAN FoREIGN PoLicY SINCE \VoRr.n \VAR II 216, 256-57 
(rev. ed. 1960). 
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the status quo and a fear of offending constituents, is said not to repre-
sent the true spirit of the nation, and to pose a negative force which 
the President must overcome.173 Though admittedly the Executive is 
often more willing to make hard decisions than Congress, there is strong 
reason to believe that on most occasions the President could persuade 
the legislators, as well as the electorate, to support wise policies. Dur-
ing the Cold War Congress has shown itself quite receptive to presi-
dential leadership in foreign affairs.- Moreover, to eliminate Congress 
as a participant in the shaping of foreign policy removes the country's 
first line of defense against an Executive who is incapable of making 
sound decisions. 
Yet another variant of the foregoing view treats Congress with more 
respect. The legislators are not dismissed as undemocratic or spineless; 
rather their opinions, like those of the people at large, are said to rest 
within the presidential bosom. Of all men, the President is deemed the 
best informed concerning popular and congressional opinion.174 Thus, 
when he acts, he does so with an awareness of what Congress would 
very probably have done had it been given the opportunity. But the 
extent to which this happy state obtains, of course, depends upon the 
President-upon the caliber of his intelligence-gathering machinery, 
upon the degree of his receptiveness to views other than his own, upon 
his ability to understand information at his disposal. And much depends 
upon the extent to which the President is willing to bow to what he 
understands to be the will of Congress and the country; even certain 
knowledge of congressional opinion provides far less a check on a de-
termined President than would the necessity of seeking formal con-
gressional approval. 
A fourth factor in the rise of the presidency has been the election of 
many men who have worked to enlarge the scope of their powers and 
173 See Morgenthau, supra note 11, at 267-68. See note 170 supra. 
174 A. ScHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 187-88, states: 
I would say that any President incorporates, in a sense, a deep awareness of 
the probable congressional reactions. I think one of the great myths of the 
presidency is that the President is the most lonely man in the world. The fact is 
that no one sees more people or is exposed to a wider range of opinion or has 
imaginatively to C."qJOSe himself to a wider hypothetical range of opinion than 
the President •••• He is not the loneliest man in the world. He knows more, 
he is aware of more and he is aware of more possibilities and more probable 
reactious and objections than anyone else. And the President knows that he has to 
incorporate in himself a sense of all this if what he does is going to be accepted. 
So the fact that this is technically a decision of his own doesn't mean that in 
practice that these considerations of what other people feel or the Congress feels 
or the country feels are excluded from his processes in making that decision. 
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responsibilities. It is at this point that serious doubts arise as to the 
capacity of Congress to reverse the trend toward executive domination 
of foreign affairs. Though the legislators still have the power to force 
even a reluctant President to consult Congress about the employment 
of force abroad,176 a majority of them may well choose not to as-
sert it. Much of the leadership would oppose for reasons of personal 
power the changes in the decision-making process that would be re-
quired. Some legislators at any time will approve of the President's 
policies and be unwilling to think in institutional terms.176 Some per-
haps would fear that realistic procedures for congressional involve-
ment in such crucial decisions could not be fashioned. Some will always 
prefer to avoid having to make such politically eA.'Plosive decisions, 
and virtually all would be hard pressed to find the time to make the 
effort to reestablish and then sustain a congressional voice in foreign 
policy decisions. The tendency, accordingly, will be to make a few 
noises about executive usurpation without really disturbing the status 
quo.177 
Should Congress not have the will to reassert itself, the fifth factor 
behind the President's rise, momentum, will continue to inure solely 
to his advantage. But should the legislators prove themselves capable of 
acting, and acting wisely, momentum may serve them also. Successful 
congressional involvement in one decision regarding the use of force 
would lead to greater opportunities for future participation as public 
and presidential confidence in Congress grew, as well as the legislators' 
confidence in themselves. 
In sum, the President's control over decisions to use force abroad 
is a perfectly natural and eA.'Plicable development, but it is not one 
inexorably necessitated by national self-interest. This is not to say that 
the President should surrender his power over the day-to-day conduct 
of foreign relations or relinquish his role as a forceful eA.1:ernal leader. 
It is to say that Congress is capable of having a voice in shaping for-
eign policies and a decisive voice on whether the United States will 
17G See text at notes 90-99 supra. 
176 There are certain institutional interests which put the Congress as a whole 
against the presidency. But I think, that despite this, many people in Congress 
believe in and support the program of the President if he is of their party. 
A. ScHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 162. See Kurland's conclusion that Americans are 
extremely result-oriented at note 78 supra. 
177 For example, the "Great Debate" over the President's authority to send troops 
to Korea and Western Europe, which raged for three months in early 1951 under the 
impetus of Senator Robert A. Taft, ultimately came to naught. See note 57 supra. 
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lllltlate the use of force abroad.178 To have this influence, Congress 
would have to alter its institutional framework, but not radically. 
The primary transformation would have to be in willpower. Lacking 
to date has been both the will to make the structural changes essential 
to a systematic, informed voice in foreign affairs, and the will to use 
existing powers179 to persuade an unconvinced President to seek mean-
ingful congressional approval before initiating foreign conflict.180 
Congressional participation in these decisions would not guarantee 
more peaceful foreign policies, though it should not lead to more con-
flict. It is difficult for Congress to fight a war through a reluctant 
President. Nor would congressional involvement ensure wise policies, 
as the legislators' myopia during the twenties and thirties indicates" 
Should Congress take stands that the President found in error on vital 
178 W. LIPPMANN, supra note 172, at 30, suggests the executive-legislative relationship 
that should prevail: 
The executive is the active power in the state, the asking and the proposing 
power. The representative assembly is the consenting power, the petitioning, the 
approving and the criticizing, the accepting and the refusing power. The two 
powers are necessary if there is to be order and freedom. But each must be 
true to its own nature, each limiting and complementing the other. The govern-
ment must be able to govern and the citizens must be represented in order that 
they shall not be oppressed. The health of the system depends upon the relation-
ship of the two powers. If either absorbs or destroys the funcnons of the other 
power, the constitution is deranged. 
179 It has been suggested that Congress, like the malapportioned plaintiffs in Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), can do very little to help themselves. Schwartz, supra note 2, 
at 1047, states; 
It is claimed that the action that is under attack has circumvented the very 
political process that the framers of the Constitution intended as a check on the 
President's power to commit American forces to combat. Thus, unless it is 
established through the courts that Congress has an indispensable role to play, 
the political branch can never perform its intended function. 
This situation, then, is much like the one in Baker v. Carr. There the decision 
in allocating power within the state was, as perhaps is the decision to commit 
troops to combat, political in the profoundest sense. Bur it became clear that 
despite the wide range of reasonable choice that might be open to state legis-
latures, apportionment was not being carried out under any rational standard 
but rather was being used simply to perpetuate the existing power structure. 
It thus became necessary for the Court to impose rationality in order to restore 
the very integrity of the political process. 
1t seems, however, that the situations of the Baker plaintiffs and Congress are significandy 
different. No amount of will power on the part of the former could have effected 
reapportionment of legislatures controlled by men from overrepresented districts 
Congress, on the other hand, is perfecdy capable itself of pressing the President into 
cooperation, if it chooses to do so. 
180 Since few Presidents are unaware that they are strongest when supported by 
Congress, and hamstrung when opposed, they are likely to bow with notable grace to 
congressional insistence on a role in shaping foreign policy-so long as the relationship 
remains that described by Lippmann, supra note 178, and so long as the legislators 
make their decisions in terms of their understanding of the national interest. 
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matters, however, he would probably do as Woodrow Wilson and 
Franklin Roosevelt did. No branch of government will ever find its powers 
respected if it insists on taking positions that do not respond to con-
temporary realities. 
Congressional participation would have one clear benefit. It would 
add legitimacy to the use of American troops abroad. The Constitution 
as popularly understood would be heeded, with substantial gains for the 
rule of law.181 Moreover, a congressionally authorized conflict would 
receive greater public backing than would presidentially authorized 
hostilities. Such political support is crucial in modern limited wars, which 
are more easily lost in domestic politics than on foreign battlefields. 
Of course, it is also possible that congressional involvement in the de-
cision-making could lead to wiser policies; the mere process of articu-
lating and debating goals and strategies might lead all concerned to a 
fuller understanding of the interests and alternatives at stake. It bears 
reiteration that the articulation and debate, if it is to be meaningful, 
must begin with the shaping of the policies that lead to the need to 
consider the use of force, and not with the actual determination whether 
to fight. 
UNILATERAL EXEcUTIVE WAR PoWERS IN OUTLINE 
Even with meaningful congressional participation in foreign affairs 
decision-making, it seems that independent executive power over the 
use of force would remain in at least five areas. 
First. The President would doubtless continue to be the primary 
initiating force in American foreign relations.182 He would structure 
our policies and present them to Congress for its advice and consent. In 
most instances, Congress would very likely accept and follow his 
guidance. He would retain his control over the recognition of states 
and governments and over the conduct and maintenance of diplomatic 
intercourse-each potentially important to questions of war and peace. 
Even when working under a meaningful congressional war resolution-
one specifying the time, place and purpose of the use of force-his 
powers as Commander-in-Chief over strategy, tactics and weapons, and 
his control over negotiations with the enemy, allies and other states 
would have great impact upon the nature of the conflict. 
Second. The President could respond unilaterally to direct, physical 
181 See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying te~"t. 
182 See note 178 supra and accompanying text. 
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assaults upon the territory of the United States or its possessions. The 
blow need not have actually fallen before he initiates defensive meas-
ures, if the attack appears to be imminent and inevitable. The presi-
dential response, however, should be proportionate to the assault, suf-
ficient ouly to repel the attackers and to ensure that they lack the 
immediate capacity to strike again. Before proceeding beyond such 
defensive measures, the President should seek the authorization of 
Congress.183 Though no reasonable congressman would oppose defense 
of American territorial integrity, once an attack is repelled many legis-
lators might wish to limit in some manner the means taken to resolve 
the hostilities so commenced. 
Third. American citizens or military units under sudden attack 
abroad can, of course, defend themselves to the best of their ability. 
When the attack takes place in international territory, air or sea, the 
situation becomes closely analogous to an assault on American territory, 
and the President could take all steps necessary to stifle the attack. He· 
might, for example, have resisted with all available force recent North 
Korean attacks on American reconnaisance units. 
But when the attack occurs within the territory of another state, he 
should use force to defend the beseiged ouly if his action is unlikely 
to risk the initiation of substantial hostilities, and only if it does not 
involve battle with the troops of the state in question, as opposed to 
battle with individuals not under its control.184 The joint 1965 effort 
by the United States and Belgium to rescue whites trapped by rebellious 
elements in the Congo seems to have been a prime instance of constitu-
tional rescue action by the President. An attempt to recover the Pueblo 
and its crew, once they were forced into port, however, would have 
risked renewal of the Korean War and almost surely would have in-
volved a pitched battle with North Korean forces; thus, the venture 
would have required congressional authorization. Military reprisals 
183 For example, in the event of conventional shelling of coastal cities by foreign 
submarines, the President could clear coastal waters of enemy ships. An attack on 
the enemy homeland, however, should await congressional approval. 
184 When such individuals become disciplined insurgents who control appreciable 
territory, rather than a mob or ill-organized rebels, they should be treated as the 
forces of a de facto state for purposes of judging the appropriateness of presidential 
action against them. Moreover, special considerations become applicable when forces 
under the control of one country oppose United States presence in a third country. H 
such forces are irregular, and escalation of the conflict is unlikely, presidential action 
may be permissible. On the other hand, where intervention is likely to lead to increased 
hostilities, congressional involvement is mandatory. 
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against another state to avenge its attacks upon American citizens or 
troops should always have prior congressional approval. 
Should the President conclude that an immediate response is es-
sential, he could act and simultaneously go to Congress with his rec-
ommendations. Presumably the President could make the strongest 
case for immediate response when he is able to act effectively while 
the attack is yet in progress; upon its completion, there would generally 
be less cause for haste.185 Similarly, should the President determine 
that secrecy is essential to a successful response, he could delay his sub-
mission of the matter to Congress. 
Fourtb. The President could respond unilaterally to attacks on 
American security interests abroad if he concludes that no delay can 
be brooked or if he feels that absolute secrecy in the initial planning 
and execution of the American response is essential. He must, how-
ever, inform Congress as soon as feasible, seeking ratification for the 
-steps taken and authorization for future action. During the Korean 
invasion, arguably there was cause for unilateral presidential response 
in the interests of speed, and during the Cuban Missile Crisis in the 
interests of secrecy. Vietnam at no point required unilateral executive 
action on these grounds. Attacks on American destroyers in the Tonkin 
Gulf fell within category three above. As noted there, the President 
could take all necessary measures to repel the assaults, but he could 
not use them to justify his initiation of further hostilities. 
Fiftb. The President could deploy American forces, intelligence mis-
sions, military aid and advisers, although he should attempt in good 
faith to prevent their use in an offensive or provocative manner with-
out congressional blessing. The prewar activities of Presidents Wilson 
and Roosevelt clearly violated this canon, but particularly in Roose-
velt's case it is difficult to fault his action, considering the low ebb of 
congressional wisdom. It is well to reiterate a point made earlier: 
Neither Congress, nor for that matter the President, will find that 
185 Delay until congressional authorization might preclude action until the attack 
had been consummated and the need for defensive measures mooted. Moreover, the 
attacking state is less likely to regard as provocative steps taken to repel its assault, as 
·opposed to the initiation of force against it in a rescue attempt or retaliatory raid. It 
seems, for example, that the United States could have recaptured the Pueblo even after 
it entered Nonh Korean territorial waters, en route to captivity, with less risk of 
leading the attackers to take additional, unrelated military action (for example, invasion 
of South Korea) than would have been the case had \Vashington, at some later date, 
staged reprisal raids or attempted to rescue the ship and its crew. 
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their constitutional powers remain intact if their policies are danger-
ously ill-advised. 
As in Vietnam, the commitment of military advisers can grow to 
something far more than originally envisioned, particularly when the 
government aided is battling indigenous insurgents who have external 
backing. At some point during the American buildup, specific congres-
sional authorization for the use of force should be sought. Perhaps the 
logical moment would be before the introduction of regular American 
units for probable combat use.186 
CoNCLUSION 
To recapitulate, the goal here has been a brief development of 
factors bearing on the scope of the President's constitutional authority 
to commit American forces to foreign conflict. If realistic limits are 
to be placed on his use of the military abroad, it seems necessary to 
lessen presidential hegemony over the shaping of foreign policies which 
lead to the need to use armed forces, as well as over actual military 
deployment. The extent of the President's constitutional prerogative 
in these areas, however, is not easily ascertained. 
As a matter of practice, presidential control has moved unevenly 
along a continuum, ranging from collaboration with and deference to 
Congress in the early years of the Republic, to the presidential faits 
accomplis of the Cold War. But even today there remain both internal 
and external restraints on the President's use of the military abroad. 
Not the least of the latter are the powers of Congress, both exercised 
and latent. 
Popular expectations regarding the constitutional uses to which the 
Executive may put the military have not kept pace with his actual 
practice. There continue to exist expectations, rooted in the language 
of the Constitution and in the intent of the Framers, that Congress 
must have a meaningful voice in decisions to initiate hostilities abroad. 
A conflict therefore exists between expectations and practice. Some 
shift in one or the other, or both, is necessary if constitutional law is 
to obtain. The resolution should be one that results in that pattern of 
expectations, realized in practice, which best serves the long-term in-
terests of the country. 
To this end, it appears that change should occur largely in the prac-
tice of the last twenty-five years. The present high state of presi-
lS!l See Moore, supra note 2, at 32. 
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dential prerogative has evolved naturally out of a set of historical and 
institutional factors which enabled the President to respond to con-
temporary pressures more easily than Congress. H Congress has the 
will, however, it too can meet the demands of modem foreign policy 
decision-making. While certain changes in institutional structure will be 
necessary, the critical factor will be the development of a congressional 
willingness to act quickly and wisely on vital issues and to use its exist-
ing powers to make its influence felt. 
It is sometimes suggested that claims of undue presidential aggrandize-
ment are pointless, since restraints exist which can hamstring executive 
policies. Thus, it is said, leave all to the political process: If the Presi-
dent is a usurper, he will be struck down in good time. The reality 
ignored, however, is that peoples' conduct is very much influenced by 
what they believe they have an obligation to do. In so sensitive an 
area as national security, the natural tendency will be to leave matters 
as they stand, since the existing order is, after all, tenable, if not clearly 
constitutional. Accordingly, unless Congress believes that it has a con-
stitutional duty to make its voice felt in these decisions, unless the Presi-
dent believes that he has a constitutional duty to seek and honor con-
gressional views on a systematic basis, and, ultimately, unless the electo-
rate insists on such a relationship between the two branches, presi-
dential hegemony will continue undisturbed, save in those rare instances 
when executive policies result in lengthy, costly and seemingly fruit-
less struggles. 
